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SUMMARY/RESUMEN 
 
 
Esta tesis examina el desarrollo histórico de la construcción y consolidación del régimen en 
Paraguay durante el periodo de 1954 – 2008. Este periodo está comprendido por dos 
distintivos regímenes-épocas; el periodo dictatorial del General Alfredo Stroessner 
comprendido desde el año 1954 a 1989 y la introducción de la democratización seguida a la 
caída del régimen del General Stroessner. Construyendo una síntesis histórica, la tesis se 
enfoca en explicar y denotar los factores internos de este desarrollo en cuestión. Esta analiza 
la estructura institucional de estos regímenes-examinando la relación jerárquica entre las 
instituciones dentro de esta estructura como un todo, a la par que examina las relaciones entre 
los regímenes y los intereses de grupos políticos, económicos y sociales como actores 
potenciales de cambios institucionales. La teoría de Douglas C. North sobre instituciones y 
cambios institucionales es aplicada como una herramienta analítica en el entendimiento de la 
construcción y consolidación de este tipo de regímenes en un nivel más elevado. 
 
 
Usando como base este marco institucional analítico, la tesis examina el desarrollo en la 
construcción de estos régimenes y en la consolidación en perspectiva de una legislación 
agraria. Entre los años 1954 a 2008, Paraguay se ha mantenido como sociedad principalmente 
rural. La agricultura constituye la maquinaria principal del crecimiento económico nacional, 
al mismo tiempo proveyendo de una fuente vital de supervivencia de la población, 
especialmente la rural. La tesis reconoce la regulación de recursos agrícolas y a esta actividad 
como un componente principal en la búsqueda de estabilidad política y legitimidad en los dos 
regímenes-épocas. En el periodo del General Stroessner la legislación agraria está interpretada 
desde su valor político como instrumento de control y como una expresión del carácter de su 
régimen. Bajo bases de democratización la tesis examina la legislación agraria como teniendo 
una función, a la par de estar constituyendo una expresión, de los mecanismos que trabajan en 
una democracia emergente. 
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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
  
 
 
1.1 Theme and Research Questions 
 
“In Paraguay, there was democracy. A fully democratic system, with absolute independence of the 
judges and the parliament. Then there was great progress. Great progress. Development.”[...] I do 
insist that in Paraguay there was order; the judiciary had the power of complete independence; justice 
was fully exercised.”1 
 
These were the words of the exiled General Alfredo Stroessner when asked about the nature 
of his rule in Paraguay between 1954 and 1989 in an interview for Grant Magazine in 1990, 
one of the few interviews he ever did. The interview portrayed Stroessner as a former dictator 
in disarray over political legacy that he had left behind. Infiltrating every aspect of 
Paraguayan life, Stroessner had become an integral part of the national identity. One may 
even argue that after thirty five years of rule Stroessner was Paraguay. However, in 1989 the 
seemingly irreplaceable leader tumbled from power in what appeared to be a sudden, 
unexpected and unprecedented change in Paraguayan political history. After centuries of 
authoritarian rule, a political regime based on democratic principle was introduced. Twenty 
years later, the democratic system is still in the making. 
 
 
This master thesis addresses the regime building and consolidation processes in Paraguay 
between Stroessner‟s ascendency to power in 1954 and 2008. In such, it is a study of the 
Stroessner regime between 1954 and 1989 and the subsequent democratic political system up 
to present day. The analysis embraces both historical continuity and change in Paraguay by 
examining two ostensibly distinctly different political regimes; dictatorship and democracy, as 
well as opening up for a comparison between the two. When the Stroesser regime fell it was 
                                                     
1
 Alfredo Stroessner in an interview with Isabel Hilton. Grant Magazine, April 1990.  
http://www.lasc.ie/news/dictator.html. Read 10.05.09. 
10 
 
the longest lasting dictatorship in the Western hemisphere. Though his downfall was abrupt, 
decision makers in the emerging democracy inherited elements from the previous regime 
implicating severe constraint to the decision making arena in the new regime. 
 
 
Though the political regime has changed, Paraguay has remained a predominantly rural 
society. Agriculture is still the main component of the national economy and the basic source 
of survival to the majority of the population. Moreover, the perseverance of limited economic 
diversification and a low rate of urbanisation, have left agriculture largely to define the pattern 
of settlement and social structure. Agriculture‟s embeddedness in Paraguayan history and 
present day society makes it a unique case in order to conduct historical analysis. This is also 
the reason why the thesis will approach the topic of regime building and consolidation 
through the sector of agriculture. More precisely, it will look at how the agrarian legislation 
can be understood as an expression of the political regimes in their search for legitimacy and 
political stability through having a vital function in these processes. Agricultural legislation 
implies a distribution of resources and privileges. According to political theory, the 
distribution of central national resources constitutes a fundamental state-function. Such 
resources are often scarce. How regimes distribute these among their subjects is therefore of 
vital importance to their existence.
2
 On a primary basis, the distribution of agriculture 
resources is regulated through law. 
 
 
 
In accordance with the reasoning above, the main research question given for the thesis is as 
follows: 
 
How can the historical development in regime building and consolidation in Paraguay in the 
period between 1954 and 2008 be understood in perspective of agrarian legislation? 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2
 Waldron 1985: 327-328; Heywood 2003: 59-61. 
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To more specifically address the subject, the thesis operates with two subordinate research 
questions: 
 
(i) how and why can agrarian legislation be interpreted as a political instrument in the 
search of regime building and consolidation under the Stroessner regime? 
  
(ii) how and why can the development in the question of a new agrarian legislation be 
interpreted as an expression of the mechanisms at work in the democratisation 
process in Paraguay? 
 
 
It is important to emphasise that the two secondary research questions examine the agrarian 
legislation both as an expression of and as having a function in the political regimes. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Defining Central Concepts 
 
 
“Democracy and dictatorship constitute different ways of organizing political lives: of selecting rules, 
processing conflicts, making and implementing public decisions.”3 
 
 
1.2.1 Authoritarian Regimes 
 
Authoritarian regimes vary greatly in their manifestations, and can therefore not be defined as 
a distinctive political system. However, some basic common features exist to characterise a 
regime as authoritarian. Primarily, authoritarian regimes are recognised by their highly 
concentrated and centralised power structures. They are established through an act of force 
                                                     
3
 Przeworski et al. 2000: 7. 
12 
 
and the ruling elite or single leader does not govern through popular consent. Moreover, 
political power is generated and maintained through the building of alliances and the 
repression of potential challengers –creating a system of high levels of political, economic, 
and social control. There are no guarantees for civil liberties in such regimes, and civil society 
is normally weak or non-existing. Authoritarian political systems can become impaired by not 
attending the demands of political supporters and of the inability to sufficiently repress the 
opposition.
4
  In the research literature the concepts „authoritarian regime‟ and „dictatorship‟ 
are normally used interchangeably, as will be the case in this thesis. Moreover, such regimes 
are often referred to as the antithesis of democracies.
5
 
 
 
 
 
1.2.2 Democratisation, Democracy, and Democratic Consolidation 
 
As authoritarian regimes, democracy is not an unambiguous phenomenon; it does not advance 
a single and agreed upon ideal of popular rule.
6
 As a type of regime, democracy has been 
identified and defined in terms of sources of authority, purposes served by government, and 
procedures for constituting government.
7
 Within this perspective, recent democratic theory 
has advanced a minimal, procedural understanding of democracy. A much used definition has 
been the one of Josef Schumpeter: “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means 
of competitive struggle for the people‟s vote”.8 Democratic theorists since Shumpeter have 
however been dissatisfied with definitions of democracy that does not require more than 
voting. More attention has recently been put on the role of the wider implementation of 
democratic institutions.
9
 Such an understanding of democracy will also be at the basis of this 
thesis. 
     
 
                                                     
4
 Linz 2000: 2; 159-161; Dominguez 2002: 1. 
5
 Gandhi 2008: 3. 
6
 Heywood 2004: 222. 
7
 Huntington 1991: 6. 
8
 Schumpeter 1943 quoted in Philip 2003: 2. 
9
 Philip 2003: 3. 
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The process of democratisation refers to the transition from a non-democratic regime towards 
the inauguration and consolidation of a democratic regime.
10
 Democratic consolidation is a 
highly debated concept, and its content is not agreed upon by scholars. A widely used 
definition has however been offered by Adam Przeworski, stating that a democracy can be 
understood as consolidated when under a given set of political and economic conditions the 
democratic system of institutions becomes the only game in town.
11
  
 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Perspective, Historiographic Traditions and Existing Knowledge 
 
 
This thesis contains traits from various historiographic traditions. In theme and perspective it 
might be understood as part of classical political history. The study of the interaction between 
institutions and organsiations in political development has been a central focus within this 
tradition.
12
 Moreover, through the emphasis on theory as an analytical tool, the thesis also 
beholds elements traditionally attributed to the social sciences. The distance between history 
and theory manifested itself in a distinction between the historical discipline and the social 
sciences in the late 19
th
 and first half of the 20
th
 century. History was understood as a 
discipline characterised by an empirical approach in understanding the past.
13
 In recent 
decades history and social sciences have moved closer.
14
 Perhaps representative of its own 
context, this thesis ought to be understood as part of this new tradition in its dimension 
between history and political science. 
 
 
 
On a general basis not much research has been conducted on Paraguay in comparison to the 
other Latin American countries –particularly from a historical perspective. The national 
                                                     
10
 Huntington 1991: 9. 
11
 Przeworski 1991: 26; Philip 2003: 7. 
12
 Kjeldstadli 1999: 76. 
13
 Kjeldstadli 1999: 111;Burke 2005: 2-13; Jordanova 2002: 55-58. 
14
 Jordanova 2000: 2; Burke 2005: 16-20. 
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history of Paraguay has been a subject of great controversy through its traditional usage as an 
instrument of patriotism and the creation of myths around various authoritarian regimes. 
 
 
Historical research on regime building and consolidation in the period between 1954 and 2008 
has been scarce, in particular from a comparative perspective between the Stroessner regime 
and the emerging democracy. An important contribution has however been made by José 
Molinas et al. in their article Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy 
Outcomes in Paraguay, 1954-2003.
15
   
 
 
 
In terms of the agrarian legislation, research has been mainly been conducted from a social 
science perspective. One historical contribution that is important to mention, however, is 
Carlos Pastore‟s La Lucha por Tierra en el Paraguay from 1972.16 This is a historical 
analysis concerning the struggle for land in Paraguayan national history up to the days of the 
Stroessner regime. Moreover, the agrarian legislation under Stroessner has been thoroughly 
studied from a socioeconomic developmental perspective. Two international contributions 
especially worth emphasising in this respect are Annelies Zoomers‟ Rural Development and 
Survival Strategies in Central Paraguay from 1988
17
 and J.M.G. Kleinpenning‟s Man and 
Land in Paraguay from 1987.
18
 The Paraguayan sociologist Ramón Fogel has been a driving 
force in the research on agrarian relations under Stroessner from a national perspective.
19
 So 
has another  Paraguayan sociologist, Tomás Palau, who has focused on the political elements 
of the agrarian legislation during the Stroessner regime.
20
 However, so far no systematic 
research on the political perspective of the legislation in this period has been conducted.  
 
 
 
The democratic development in the country is fairly recent history. This may largely explain 
the lack of historical studies on the period. Research in relation to the agrarian development 
                                                     
15
 Molinas et al. et al. 2006. 
16
 Pastore 1972. 
17
 Zoomers 1988. 
18
 Kleinpenning 1987. 
19
 Fogel 1989; Fogel 1992; Fogel 1996; Fogel 2006. 
20
 Palau 1996. 
15 
 
under democratisation has mainly been concentrated on conflicts over land between rural 
interest groups and the Paraguayan State. A vital contribution to the study of this development 
is Quintin Riquelme‟s Los sin tierra en Paraguay. Conflictos Agrarios y movimiento 
campesino, from 2003. No research has to the best of this author‟s knowledge been conducted 
on the agrarian legislation during the age of democratisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4 The Analytic Framework and Methodological Challenges 
 
A regime constitutes a specific way of organising political life. Articulated more specifically, 
a regime can be interpreted as the managing and defining of the character of the state. In a 
minimal definition, the state can be understood as consisting of a set of institutions, which 
again are organised internally in a hierarchy.
21
 The agrarian legislation examined in this thesis 
is analysed in relation to its function within, and as an expression of, the workings of this 
larger whole. In such, it needs to be specified that the agrarian legislation in this thesis is 
understood in light of the theory of legal positivism. This theory states that the origin and 
nature of any legislation is to be found within the framework from which it was created. Law 
is created to address a specific subject and has a specific purpose, and is the result of decision 
making conducted within a particular set of social rules.
22
 
 
 
Analysing the regime building and consolidation in Paraguay between 1954 and 2008 in 
relation to the agrarian legislation, the thesis can thus be identified as having an institutional 
focus. By looking at changes and development in the given regime‟s institutional frameworks, 
the analysis can be understood as seeking a genetic explanation to the historical development 
in question.
23
 In particular, the development and changes in the agrarian legislation as part of 
this larger institutional whole will be explored, as well as the regulation of rural interest 
                                                     
21
 Heywood 2004: 75-76. 
22
 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/. Read 10.05.09; Tebbit 2000: 10-11. 
23
 Kjeldstadli 1999: 250. 
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groups through the agrarian legislation as an example and an expression of the relations 
between the regimes and political and social actors in the Paraguayan society. In the search of 
understanding the connections between the mechanisms at work within these processes, this 
can be understood as an ambition of constructing a historical synthesis of the development 
and change in the Paraguayan regime building and consolidation.   
 
 
The use of theory as an analytic tool contributes to the process of thought, as a devise in 
defining and characterising the relations between cause and effect, and can provide useful in 
organising argumentation.
24
 In this thesis the theory of institutions and institutional change by 
Douglass C. North will be applied to be able to examine the regime building and 
consolidation in Paraguay on a meta-level. North‟s theory is particularly useful to this study 
as it provides an explanation for both the relation between institutional levels, as well as 
between institutions and political, economic, and social actors within a society. Most 
importantly, North‟s theory provides an explanation of historical change and development.  
 
The framework presented above is relevant because it contributes to making more tangible the 
mechanisms and processes in the historical development under examination. Moreover it 
proves an important tool in making clear the dynamic and tension between different elements, 
at the same time as it makes clear the complexity in the underlying correlations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
24
 Kjeldstadli 1999: 310-311. 
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1.5 Sources 
 
In the seven months between June and January 2008/2009 I was in the capital of Asunción in 
Paraguay conducting research for this thesis. The field study was grounded in the problems I 
encountered in the second semester of my master studies in the assignment of locating and 
analysing available and relevant sources to this project. It soon became clear the difficulties of 
gaining insight and access to these from such a far distance. However, the continuing search 
for sources in Paraguay came with its own challenges. First of all, the maneuvering in an 
unknown culture of conduct and the structure of the Paraguayan highly informal public 
administration made the quest for sources a lengthy process due to the lack of tradition for 
keeping archives. Moreover, the access to any official document was determined by the need 
to first establish a personal connection with the public official in charge, and sometimes as 
well by the ethical dilemma of having to pay an „unofficial fee‟ for a speedy retrieval of the 
actual sources.
25
  
 
 
Moreover, the agrarian question in Paraguay is a highly sensitive topic. Though well known 
through the media and in society in general that corruption and other types of violent crime 
had been and continues to be common in agricultural issues, few were willing to provide 
relevant information through interviews or through other available sources in fear of 
incrimination. In particular, few sources were available from the Stroessner dictatorship as 
many of them were reported to have been „lost‟ or misplaced. Finally, the lack of a regular 
and continuous research from the Paraguayan State on agricultural issues in past decades 
diminished the source material I initially had presumed available at the start of this project. 
The encountering of the above mentioned problems have contributed in shaping the final 
perspective of my thesis as the initial questions asked in the beginning of this research project 
changed has been adjusted, as it often does according to the hermeneutic circle of research. 
Finally, it is of relevance to mention the value of getting to know the Paraguayan society as 
the experience of the field-study provided me with a crucial understanding of the complexity 
of the agrarian question in Paraguay.
26
 
                                                     
25
 Because of low public salaries, bribes are accepted in Paraguay as a common form of compensation. Marió, 
Silva-Leander and Carter 2004: 31. 
26
 Moreover, the stay also provided me with a better knowledge of the Spanish language that has been of vital 
importance in the understanding and interpreting of the source material. 
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The primary sources for the analysis in this thesis are the agrarian laws implemented during 
the period of 1954 and 2008. These sources constitute the foundation of the analysis 
conducted in this thesis. Law 854/63 and Law 852/63 creating respectively the Agrarian 
Statute of 1963 and the Institute of Rural Welfare (IBR), together with the 1967 National 
Constitution, were enforced under the Stroessner regime. In the period of democratisation 
Law 1863/02 creating the Agrarian Statute of 2002, and Law 2419/04 creating the INDERT in 
2004 were established. Together these laws constituted the legal basis for regulating agrarian 
resources and agricultural activity in the period under investigation.   
 
The Agrarian Censuses of 1956, 1981, 1991 and 2008 are used to provide information of the 
general socioeconomic development in the period under examination. These contain national 
and regional statistical data over agricultural activity and access and distribution of land in 
Paraguay. The 2008 Census was published in late April, 2009, and has therefore not yet been 
used in any other research. National statistics over development in population growth and 
poverty development are also used. The data in these Censuses is controversial, though they 
constitute the only source of information of this kind.
27
 
 
The source material providing information on the historical context in the two regime epochs 
is of different character. There exist few other sources than the agrarian Censuses that can cast 
light over the agrarian development under the Stroessner regime. The contextual 
understanding of this period is thus gathered from the existing literature. As the national 
newspapers under the dictatorship were placed under heavy censorship they have a limited 
value as an account of historical events. Considering the special characteristic of these 
articles, they may however be considered useful sources in gaining insight in how Stroessner 
                                                     
27
Censo Agropecuario Nacional Nacional 1956; Censo Agropecuario Nacional Nacional 1981;Censo 
Agropecuario Nacional Nacional 1991;Censo Agropecuario Nacional Nacional 2008;Censo Nacional de 
Población y Viviendas 1950;Censo Nacional de Población y Viviendas 1962;Censo Nacional de Población y 
Viviendas 1972;Censo Nacional de Población y Viviendas 1982;Censo Nacional de Población y Viviendas 
2002;Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 2002;Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 2003;Encuesta Permanente de 
Hogares 2004;Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 2005. 
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used the media to create legitimacy for his governing. This will in particular be examined in 
relation to the agrarian legislation.  
 
The journal Informativo Campesino has provided a vital source in analysing the agrarian 
development in the period of democratisation. This is a journal first published in 1989 by the 
Centre of Documentation and Studies in Asunción. The centre is a non-governmental 
organisation dedicated to the documentation and research of rural national relations and social 
science in general. The Informativo Campesino is only one of many publications. The journal 
contains a collection of information concerning the agrarian situation in the country on a 
month to month basis. Its content is divided in information concerning campesino 
organsiaitons, manifestations and detentions concerning rural conflicts, agrarian politics, 
interviews of campesino leaders, politicians, and experts on agrarian relations, international 
news, and general agricultural related news. The sources of the journal are mainly a collection 
of articles from all the national newspapers. Informativo Campesino is a monthly journal, and 
in order to conduct the analysis in this thesis, all issues between 1989 and 2008 has been 
collected and investigated. Moreover, international newspapers such as the New York Times 
have been consulted in order to see this period in a wider international context. 
 
 
 
1.6 Structure 
 
The structure of the thesis is principally chronological in its analysis. This is a functional 
structure because it strengthens the historical dimension of the analysis as well as it provides 
an incentive to conduct a comparative study of the two regime epochs. 
 
 
Chapter two provides the historical contextual framework for the analysis of the agrarian 
legislation in relation to the regime building and consolidation in the following chapters. This 
is done by identifying Paraguay as an agrarian country as well as giving a short presentation 
of the macro-historical development between 1954 and 2008.  
20 
 
 
Chapter three concerns the Stroessner regime in the period between 1954 and 1989. The 
chapter addresses the first of the subordinate research question given for the thesis through 
analysing the agrarian legislation implemented under Stroessner.  
Chapter four analyse the period of democratisation between 1989 and 2008. It addresses the 
second of the subordinate research questions by analysing the question of the implementation 
of a new agrarian legislation to replace the 1egislation from the former regime, and by 
analysing the implementation of a new agrarian legislation at the end of the period under 
examination.   
 
 
The fifth chapter discusses the findings in the two previous chapters with a special focus on 
the institutional analytic framework. It examines the institutional frameworks of the regimes 
in a meta-perspective by applying the theory of North. This is done with the aim of making 
more visible the dynamics and the complexity in the development and changes in the regime 
building and consolidation in question. Through this discussion the chapter aims at making 
more visible the agrarian legislation as an expression of and a function in these processes as 
according to the secondary research questions given for the thesis. Moreover, the chapter 
shortly also examines the regime building and consolidation in Paraguay in a wider historical 
regional context. 
 
 
The final chapter contains summary the findings in the thesis and some concluding remarks 
concerning the road ahead in Paraguay concerning the suggestions to a new agrarian 
legislation under evaluation in Congress.
28
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2 CHAPTER 2: PRESENTING PARAGUAY; THE ROLE OF 
AGRICULTURE AND MACRO-HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, 
1954 – 2008 
 
 
 
                Map 2.1 Paraguay 
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2.1 Presenting Paraguay 
 
Because of its central location, encircled by Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil, Paraguay has often 
been referred to as the heart of Latin America. Even so, the existence of the small and 
landlocked country has historically been somewhat below the radar. Its capital Asuncion was 
founded in 1537 by the banks of the Paraguay River as a base to further expansion of Spanish 
ambitions in Latin America. However, due to the lack of precious metals and mineral wealth 
combined with the poor access to markets, it became a neglected outpost governed from 
Buenos Aires. In 1811 as the first nation in Latin America, Paraguay declared independence 
from the Spanish crown.
29
 The character of its national history has been that of a poor and 
isolated agricultural country marked by devastating wars with its powerful neighbours and by 
long periods of authoritarian governments, intercepted by periods of high levels of political 
instability in the 19
th
 century. After decades of political turmoil Stroessner brought political 
and economic stability to the country in the second half of the 20
th
 century –though not 
without severe social costs. Democratisation in 1989 was a novelty to the poor and rural Latin 
American country which created new possibilities, though also new challenges that had to be 
addressed.   
 
With the approach of legal positivism as a premise for understanding and explaining the 
agrarian legislation in Paraguay in relation to regime building and consolidation, a first step is 
to provide the necessary contextual framework for the analysis.30 In doing this, the chapter 
first identifies and defines Paraguay as an agricultural country. Second, it provides a short 
presentation of the macro-historical political, economic, and social development between 
1954 and 2008. Through this presentation the chapter especially aims at identifying important 
historical turning points, processes, and events of crucial relevance to the analysis in the 
following chapters. Though the focus is on the period between 1954 and 2008, long-term 
historical lines will be drawn when found necessary in explaining certain processes and 
events. 
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 For a definition of legal positivism, see chapter one. 
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2.2 Paraguay as an Agricultural Country 
 
As one of the most rural societies in Latin America, agriculture has in a historical perspective 
been of fundamental importance to the Paraguayan economy. It has also had a vital role in 
absorbing the country‟s growing population in the 20th century by providing domestic food 
requirement.31 The agriculture in Paraguay in the period between 1954 and 2008 experienced 
significant development through the introduction of capitalist farming alongside the 
traditional forms of subsistence agriculture, resulting in a more heterogenic agricultural sector 
and an altering of the existing patterns of land holdings and production.32  This section will 
start by giving a presentation of some main characteristics in this development, defining the 
broader patterns of access to and distribution of land and agricultural activity. 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Distribution and Access to Land 
 
As in most of Latin America, the land distribution in Paraguay has traditionally developed 
along the lines of a latifundia-minifundia system. This is a system characterised by its high 
polarisation in access to land. The latifundias on one side are defined as large pieces of landed 
property covering tremendous areas and are typically low in intensive and efficient use of the 
land. On the other side the minifundias are described as small farm units insufficient in size to 
provide a sustainable living for the people cultivating it.
33
 The definition of minifundias in 
Paraguay has been set to lots between 1 and 5 hectares. If not irrigated and intensively 
farmed, this amount of land cannot support levels of consumption above the extreme poverty 
line without other sources of income.
34
 The campesinos living out of these pieces of land have 
therefore often had to seek additional employment outside the agricultural sector. 
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 Marió, Silva-Leander and Carter 2004: 7. 
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 World Bank 1995: 2. 
33
 Barraclough 1999: 6; Kuhnen 1982: section 1.2. 
34
 Zoomers 1988: 17. 
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Opposite to its neighbouring countries, latifundias were not introduced in Paraguay in any 
great scale as a consequence of the European colonisation in the 16
th
 century. Rather, it was 
the result of the selling enormous tracts of state land
35
 to foreign investors and the diminutive 
Paraguayan elite as an effort to compensate for a lack of state income and to pay debts from 
the devastating Triple Alliance War.
36
 Almost throughout the 19
th
 century, because of low 
population density, land in Paraguay had been abundant. The vast majority of campesinos had 
access to sufficient land to make a living, a few as private owners though most of them as 
tenants or occupiers of land. However, facing the massive sale of state land at the end of the 
century, the campesinos were unable to protect their holdings against the expansion of the 
latifundias as they had insufficient capital to take part in the buying of land.
37
  
 
According to Annelies Zoomers in her study of rural development in Paraguay, the situation at 
the end of the 1800s had two important consequences in the subsequent century. First, 
insufficient measures were taken to change the unfavourable tenure situation for the 
campesinos, resulting in the fact that only 26.3% of all Paraguayan farmers had definite titles 
to their land by 1956.
38
 Data suggests that four decades later this number was at 
approximately 60%.
39
 Second, as most land was controlled by latifundias, facing a growing 
population, lack of work opportunities outside of agriculture, and a system of partial 
inheritance
40
, the campesinos had no choice but to split up the land they already possessed. 
Consequently, this lead to an acceleration of minifundism.
41
 In particular this resulted in 
increasing problems in the Central Region
42
, an area approximately 150 kilometres east of the 
capital of Asuncion. Historically, due to geographic and climatic conditions, most agricultural 
activity had been concentrated in this part of the country. The majority of the Paraguayan 
campesinos were confined to sharing the land in this area, equalising only 7.2% of the 
national territory, as the rest of the land in the country was controlled by the latifundias or 
                                                     
35
 In the mid-1800s the Paraguayan state was the country‟s largest landowner, owning up to 60% of the land. 
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owned by the state. Naturally, this meant a concentration of population in the same area.
43
 
Data suggests that in 1962 as much as 45% of all Paraguayans were living in the Central 
Region, accounting for 57% of the country‟s rural population.44 
 
 
Map 2.2: The Central Region circled in red. 
 
 
Though there are geographical reasons to why large properties should exist in parts of 
Paraguay, as much of the Chaco region in the north-west is only suitable for very extensive 
cattle production, the introduction of latifundias in the 19
th
 century caused the emergence of a 
highly skewed pattern of land distribution.45 Data from the 1956 Agrarian Statute indicate that 
of the nearly 150 000 existing exploitations of land, 45.9% consisted of units with less than 
five hectares, only controlling 1% of the total of agricultural land.46 Comparing the data in the 
1956 Census with the Censuses of 1981, 1991 and 2008, the findings indicate, as 
demonstrated in the tables below, that distribution of land in Paraguay continued to be highly 
skewed throughout into the 21
st
 century as well.47 Furthermore, though the exact figures have 
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 Censo Agropecuario Nacional 1956. 
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been highly debated, Paraguay in this period experienced an increasing amount of landless 
campesinos as occupants of land they did not own.48  
 
 
Table 2.1      Land holdings in Paraguay according to number of exploitation 
 1956 1981 1991 2008 Number of exploitations (%) 
Exploitations 
according to size 
Number 
of expl. 
Number of 
expl. 
Number of 
expl. 
Number of 
expl. 1956 1981 1991 2008 
0-5 ha 68 714 89 654 122 750 118 003 45.9 36.0 40.0 40.8 
5-10 ha 34 949 49 511 66 605 66 218 23.4 19.9 21.7 23.0 
10-100 ha 41 011 99 491 105 319 87 480 27.4 40.0 34.3 30.3 
100-500 ha 2802 6932 7782 10 487 1.9 2.8 2.7 3.6 
500 – 1000 ha 589 1053 1525 * 0.4 0.4 0.5 ** 
1000-10 000 ha 1274 1965 2889 * 0.8 0.8 0.9 ** 
10 000 ha and over 275 324 351 *7478 0.2 0.1 0.1 ** 
PARAGUAY 149 614 248 930 307 221 288 892 100 100 100 100 
Sources: 1956, 1981, 1991, 2008 Censo Agropecuario. Ha: abbreviation for hectare.  
* Lacking data. The number showing in the column ‟10 000 ha and over‟ comprises the exploitations between 
500 and 10 000 ha and over. This is due to the fact that the 2008 Agrarian Census does not make a distinction 
between these exploitations. 
** Lacuna in the dataset implies that the relative distribution of exploitations cannot be calculated for these 
sections. However, to get a rough idea of the development, it is possible to aggregate all the data in the 
categories „100-100 ha‟, „1000-10 000 ha‟, and „10 000 ha and over‟ in the 1956, 1989, and 1991 Censuses – and 
thereby making these figures comparable with the data in the 2008 Census. Such an exercise indicate the 
following development in relative terms: 3.3% in 1956, 4.1% in 1981, 4.1% in 1991, and 2.6% in 2008. 
 
 
The 1981 Agrarian Census suggested that 0.9% of the nation‟s more than almost 250 000 
exploitations at this time covered 78.6% of all farmland. By contrast, the minifundias which 
made up 36% of all farms at the time covered only 1% of the total land. The average size of a 
                                                     
48
 Roett and Sacks 1991: 79; Palau 1996: 171. 
27 
 
minifundia was 1.7 hectares, smaller than what was believed to be necessary for a rural 
family‟s subsistence.49 Data from the following Census in 1991 indicated that the situation 
during the 1980s had not changed much. 1% of the holdings were still controlling 77% of the 
agricultural land.50  
 
 
 
Table 2.2   Land holdings in Paraguay according to area (ha) 
 
1956 1981 1991 2008 
Size of holdings according to total 
area of agricultural land in use (%) 
Exploitations 
according to size 
Area ha Area ha Area ha Area ha 1956 1981 1991 2008 
0-5 ha 162 706 169 137 231 349 238 013 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.7 
5-10 ha 230 207 322 050 430 658 416 702 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.3 
10-100 ha 841 081 2 101 954 2 167 359 1 764 952 5.0 9.5 9.1 5.4 
100-500 ha * 1 396 946 1 619 203 2 300 193 * 6.3 6.8 7.1 
500-1000 ha *997 762 707 007 1 010 952 *** * 3.2 4.2 *** 
1000-10 000 ha ** 5 916 420 8 627 311 *** * 27.0 36.2 *** 
10 000 ha and over **8 782 991 11 327 016 9 730 949 ***27 807 215 * 51.6 40.8 *** 
PARAGUAY 16 816 618 21 940 531 23 817 737 32 527 075 100 100 100 100 
Sources: 1956, 1981, 1991, 2008 Censo Agropecuario. Ha: abbreviation for hectare.  
* Lacking data. The number in the column „500-1000 ha‟ comprises the data for the categories „100-500 ha‟ and 
„500-1000 ha‟. 
 
** Lacking data. The number in the column „10 000 ha and over‟ comprises the data for the categories „1000-
10 000 ha‟ and ‟10 000 ha and over‟.  
 
*** The 2008 Census only contains data of exploitations according to size in the category „500 ha and more‟. As 
mentioned in regards to table 2.1, it does not make distinctions within this category. When the data in the 1956, 
1981, 1991 censuses is made compatible with the data in the 2008 Census, the calculations within the category 
„500 ha and more‟ suggests the following development: 52.2% in 1956, 81.8% in 1981, 81.3% in 1991, and 
85.4% in 2008.  
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Nonetheless, at the same time a new trend during this period of time became visible in the 
increase of the middle-sized exploitations between 10 and 500 hectares.51 Recently attained 
data from 2008, seventeen years since the previous census, indicate a slight decrease in access 
to land for the minifundias as the date suggests that a higher number of farms had to share a 
smaller amount of land. Moreover, the 2008 Census indicates a concentration of land for the 
exploitations over 500 hectares, fewer exploitations controlling a larger amount of land. This 
seems to be a result of a decrease in number of middle sized farms, in particular of holdings in 
the range between 10 and 100 hectares.52 Furthermore, a decrease in the rural population in 
the period between the 1991 and the 2008 Census might contribute to explaining parts of this 
development.53 
 
The unequal distribution of land in Paraguay can be seen as somewhat of a paradox, as the 
expansion in agricultural land has been percieved as virtually limitless at the same time as the 
country has remained under-populated. James Painter, researcher and writer for the Latin 
American Bureau in London, argues that the problem in Paraguay has not been the actual lack 
of farmland, as much as the difficulties for the Paraguayan farmers getting into a market 
dominated by foreign investors, as well as the lack of sufficient job opportunities outside of 
agriculture – in particular due to the lack of a viable industrial sector in the country.54 Both the 
skewed distribution of land and the lack of definite titles are presumed by scholars to have 
had wide implications, resulting in low agricultural efficiency and productivity, as well as 
bringing about potential social tension and increasing poverty.55 
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2.2.2 Using the Land 
 
With the Paraguay River as the line of division, Paraguay can be separated in two natural 
regions very different in characteristics. The already mentioned north-western part, the Chaco, 
made up by the departments of Presidente Hayes, Boquerón and Alto Paraguay
56
 consists of 
large plains with semi-arid climatic conditions. Most soils in this area are unsuited for crop 
production, though provides good conditions for cattle ranching. The region east of the 
Paraguay River provides much more favourable soil conditions and climate, and as already 
mentioned, most of the country‟s agriculture in form of crop production has historically been 
located here.
57
  
 
Though Paraguay was regarded as a predominantly agricultural country at the time, data from 
the 1956 agrarian census indicate that the area used for agriculture took up only 41% of the 
national territory. 85% of this land was being used for forestry and cattle ranching.58 Only 4% 
was covered by agricultural crops. The cultivated area was mainly utilized for growing 
subsistence goods such as manioc, maize, beans and groundnuts. In addition, the growing and 
production of sugar cane, yerba mate, fruit, rice, and cotton were directed towards 
commercialisation, though only constituting a fraction of total crop produce and area under 
cultivation in 1956. In the following decades the area used for agriculture expanded, as did the 
use of new methods of production.59 Especially the advent of capitalist farming for export in 
the 1970s was accompanied by large-scale investments in modern farming methods and 
equipment.60 Important products for export were cotton, wheat, beef, and especially soya. In 
2008 Paraguay was the sixth largest soya producer in the world.61 Though the introduction of 
capitalist farming brought an improvement in agricultural methods and technology, 
agricultural activity on the minifundias remained throughout the period relatively 
rudimentary. The use of agricultural chemicals, fertiliser and improved seeds stayed low. 
Moreover, the period was characterised by a continued use of draft animals and family labour. 
The slow development in the minifundia-sector has been explained by a number of causes 
such as poor education and information. One of the main explanations has though been the 
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lack of secure titles to their land, consequently resulting in a low investment initiative, as well 
as insufficient capital as the indefinite titles excluded the small farmers from access to formal 
credit.62  
 
 
 
 
2.3 The Macro-Historical Development, 1954 – 2008 
 
Having set the basis for Paraguay as an agricultural country, the following section of the 
chapter will present the key features in the broader political, economical and social 
development between 1954 and 2008. As the thesis aims at understanding and explaining 
Paraguay‟s agrarian legislation as part of the larger political regime structure, this section will 
start by identifying the basic characteristics of the political development in the period. 
 
 
  
 
2.3.1 The Political Regimes; From Dictatorship towards Democracy 
 
 
2.3.1.1 The Stroessner Era 1954 - 1989 
 
Stroessner came to power on May 4
th
, 1954, as a partaker in the coup d‟état against the sitting 
president Federico Cháves. On the 15
th
 of August the same year he was declared president.
63
 
The characteristics of the political system developed under Stroessner have been a subject of 
dispute, and though clearly authoritarian and patrimonial, its incorporated elements have 
made it difficult to fit in any specific authoritarian category or definition. The existence of the 
new regime was founded in an arrangement between what came to be called the “triumvirate” 
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of power, consisting of the Armed Forces, the Colorado Party and the government. Within 
this relationship Stroessner functioned as the unifying axis, in his role as president, honorary 
president of the Colorado Party, and commander in chief of the Armed Forces.
64
 The 
triumvirate was based on the idea that Stroessner would remain in office for the foreseeable 
future on the grounds of the enforcement of two agreements. First, the military leaders were to 
have the control over rent-seeking
65
 activities such as smuggling operations and drug 
trafficking. Second, the political elite in the Colorado Party would control and distribute 
positions in the public administration.
66
  
  
Power was institutionalised through the combination of historical tradition of political 
interpersonal relations in form of patronage and clientilism and nominally democratic 
institutions such as regularly held elections, a multi-party system, and the division of power 
between the executive, the legislative and judiciary branches of government. A new national 
Constitution implemented in 1967 would function as the legal fundament of the regime. 
Legitimised and organised within the institutional framework, Stroessner operated in the 
Paraguayan society through a series of control mechanisms. Unifying the Colorado Party, 
Stroessner transformed it into a nationwide political instrument based on clientilistic relations, 
tying people at all social levels to the regime –also within the ruling elite.67 
 
Furthermore, earning one of the most severe human rights violation records in Latin America, 
repression and manipulation was operationalised through the Armed Forces and the police. It 
was also ideologically legitimised through a “doctrine of national security”. According to this 
doctrine the enemy of the state was internal and to be found in the opposition. The opposition 
was influenced by international communist groups manifesting themselves in antigovernment 
movements around the world, and needed therefore to be fought against. An acceptance of 
Stroessner‟s use of repression was also sought created by personalising the country‟s 
                                                     
64
 Fowler 1996: 104; Molinas et al. 2006: 7. 
65
 In short, rent-seeking refers to the search of economic regulation and institutional change  by interest groups in 
their pursuit of generating income. Those who seek regulation are normally well-organised smaller groups 
willing and able to invest resources to obtain it. Rent seeking is defined as a socially costly pursuit of wealth, as 
those injured by such regulations often constitutes the majority of a society.    In Paraguay this activity was 
intrinsically connected to the clientilistic relations so deeply imbedded in the structure of the Stroessner regime. 
Source: Mokyr 2003: 364-367.   
66
 Molinas et al. 2006: 11. 
67
 Miranda 1990: 5; Roett and Sacks 1991: 126-127; Fowler 1996: 104-105; Molinas et al. 2006: 7. 
32 
 
authoritarian historical tradition through the manipulation of historical events, figures, and 
records, and through the creation of “mentalities” of heroism, courage, and patriotism against 
the common enemy found in the opposition forces.
68
 
 
Nonetheless, the beginning of the 1980s marked the start of a series of political, economic, 
and social changes that eventually would lead to the downfall of Stroessner.
69
 Mistrust to 
government policies and demands for political change came forth by previous political 
support groups as economic recession
70
 became evident. Moreover, the international society 
was increasingly pressing for democracy. As a result of the emerging crackles in the regime, 
the mid-1980s witnessed an awakening of civil society. Then, on February 4
th
, 1989, 
Stroessner was ousted in a coup d’état lead by his son in law, and second in command, 
General Andres Rodrígues. What had triggered the coup was the division over spoils of 
government by the elite in the Colorado Party, as well as a growing dissatisfaction amongst 
junior officers in the Paraguayan army.
71
 
 
 
 
2.3.1.2 Democratisation 1989 – 2008 
 
Paraguay witnessed a changed political and social reality as a first time democratisation 
process gave way to new challenges that had to be addressed. After overthrowing Stroessner, 
General Rodríguez called a quick presidential election, and won. The most significant 
changes in this period were the introduction of new political liberties in form of democratic 
rights, such as the right to organisation and freedom of speech. The newfound freedoms 
resulted in a notable increase in the civil society and the emerging of new political pressure 
groups.72 However, the period was characterised by high levels of control by the Rodríguez 
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Government. Despite political liberalisation, no further extensive democratic reforms were 
introduced in the first three years after the coup, and democratisation evolved within the old 
structures of the previous regime. In particular, decision making continued to be conducted 
within the structures of old alliance between the government, the Armed Forces, and the 
Colorado Party.73 
 
In 1992 a new national Constitution was implemented, significantly changing the power 
relations in the formal institutional framework. The new Constitution created a greater 
equilibrium between the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary in contrast to the former 
1967 Constitution. Furthermore, it opened up for political participation by the new pressure 
groups emerging with the opening of civil society. The event was followed by the election in 
1993 of the first civilian president in 39 years.
74
   
 
However, throughout the period, serious limitations and faults lines remained existent in the 
emerging political system, making the 1990s and the beginning of the 21
st
 century a period of 
political instability and unrest.
75
 The most significant problem was the continuing of political 
decision making along the lines of old clientilist traditions despite the new the rules set by the 
1992 Constitution. Moreover, corruption was increasingly featured in the decision making 
arena in the period of democratisation. Under the Stroessner regime, corruption had largely 
been confined to the political interaction within the rural elite. However, with the changes in 
the political structure generating higher levels of political participation by new political 
actors, corruption became a common feature at all levels of political decision making.
76
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2.3.2 Macroeconomic Development and the Role of the Agricultural Sector 
 
Paraguay‟s economy has historically been constrained by its landlocked geography, making 
the country highly dependent on neighboring Brazil and Argentina as its major trading 
partners. As a colony lacking of any precious metals, political strategic importance, and of 
population, Paraguay‟s economy remained for centuries based on that of subsistence 
agriculture. In the 17
th
 and 18
th
 century the country got its first export market with the 
growing importance of Buenos Aires as the region‟s port city raising demands for Paraguayan 
yerba maté, tobacco and hides.  After independence in 1811, a system of state control over the 
economy was imposed under Paraguay‟s first dictator, the state financing itself through taxes 
and expropriation of wealthy individuals and the church, land leases, taxes on export, and 
through state enterprises such as cattle breeding, shipping and ironworks. However, the Triple 
Alliance War left the Paraguayan economy in ruins, stagnating for the next half century. To 
be able to reconstruct the economy the state relied on foreign direct investment. This marked 
the beginning of Paraguayan industry and agriculture under the influence of foreign economic 
interests.
77
 Traditionally, the Paraguay has had a very high level of informal trade, making 
accurate economical measures somewhat difficult to obtain.
78
   
 
Important economic changes came forth in between 1954 and 2008 in several stages. When 
Stroessner came to power in 1954, the Paraguayan economy was showing signs of stagnation 
and crisis. This development was particularly evident in the agrarian sector.79 At the 
beginning of the 1960s the sector recovered from stagnation and experienced a relatively high 
rate of growth until recession once again became evident early in the 1980s.80  
 
Leading up to the 1970s Strossner had at large managed to stabilise the national economy as a 
whole. Inflation remained low, and the country had little external debt. In the 1970s, the 
economy experienced a tremendous growth, with the gross domestic product increasing 
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annually by approximately 10%.
81
 This was due to the construction of the world‟s largest 
hydroelectric plant, the Itaipu. This economic trend lasted until 1981 when the economy went 
into recession82 once the construction of the Itaipu was done. Only at the end of the decade did 
the economy begin to recover, mainly because of the agricultural sector and substantial 
improvements in macroeconomic policy management. In 1989 agriculture employed 36.8% of 
the country‟s labour force in comparison to 20% in the manufacturing sector.83   
 
The economy during the Stroessner years was under heavy state control, regulating and 
promoting investment and exports. Stroessner kept a firm grip on prices, wages, banking and 
insurance, in addition to giving price supports and subsidies to farm products such as sugar 
and meat. Compensating for the Paraguayan economy‟s incapability to finance investment in 
the domestic market, Stroessner further opened the country to foreign investors, continuing 
the tradition initiated in the previous century.
84
  
 
The democratisation process initiated in 1989 brought with it several changes in the regulation 
of the national economy. Most importantly the new political situation lead to the development 
of a market economy, and the entering into the South American trade block, Mercosur, as one 
of the founding members.
85
 In the first half of the 1990s Paraguayan economy recovered from 
the recession in the previous decade largely because of two factors. First, economic growth 
was boosted by an increase in agricultural production on the basis of the recovery of 
international cotton prises and the introduction of a cotton extension program for the 
minifundistas, combined with a quick and widespread expansion of mechanised soybean 
farming. Second, the entering into Mercosur generated an opportunity for the creation of a re-
export business based on special arrangements for duty rates for electronic supplies imported 
to the Mercosur region through Paraguay.
86
 However, between 1999 and 2002 the Paraguayan 
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economy once again fell into recession, mainly due to national political instability
87
 and a 
crisis in the small scale cotton farming in the agricultural sector. Simultaneously, crisis in the 
Brazilian and Argentinean economies strongly affected the country. As from 2003, internal 
political changes and a regional economical improvement brought the country back to a more 
stable course.
88
 In 2007 and 2008 the Paraguayan economy grew by respectively 6.4% and 
5.8% percent, the fastest growing sector being agriculture with a 10.5% growth.
89
 Throughout 
the period between 1954 and 2008 the agrarian sector constituted the basis for national 
economic growth due to its high export earnings.
90
 
 
 
 
2.3.3 The Social Development 
 
The Paraguayan society between 1954 and 2008 was characterised by under-population, low 
urbanisation, and high levels of poverty and inequality. Though urbanisation is not negligible, 
data from the 1982 Census of Population and Home indicates that almost 60% of all 
Paraguayans at this period of time were living in rural areas, a situation not significantly 
different from the 1950s and 1960s. In 2002 the corresponding number had declined to 43%.91 
The population pattern has in a historical perspective been defined by the existing agricultural 
possibilities and development.  
  
Poverty levels were throughout the period higher in the rural areas than in the cities.
92
 
Traditionally there have been two groups of rural poor in Paraguay. The first one has 
consisted of small farmers having no off-farm income generating opportunities because their 
rural occupations have been too small to sustain a livelihood. The second group has been 
comprised of landless rural inhabitants without employment in the agricultural sector, 
                                                     
87
 For details see chapter four. 
88
 Otter 2008: 94. 
89
 CIA Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pa.html#Econ. Read 
14.01.2009. 
90
 World Bank 1995: 1; Marió, Silva-Leander and Carter 2004: v. 
91
 Censo Nacional de Población y Viviendas 1950, 1962, 1972, 1982, 2002. 
92
 World Bank 1995: 1. 
37 
 
surviving by combining non-agricultural activities and subsidies.
93
 Data on the poverty levels 
in the country until the 1990s are scarce. Little research has been conducted and there exists 
no official data. However, poverty levels have been assumed by scholars to have been high 
due to lack of access to land, secure property titles, and the lack of job opportunities in other 
economic sectors.
94
 Data indicates that rural poverty levels were increasing throughout the 
1990s and stabilising in 2000. In the period towards 2007 data suggests that rural poverty 
somewhat decreased.
95
 
 
As this chapter has provided a historical framework for the period between 1954 and 2008 by 
identifying and defining Paraguay as an agricultural country and presenting important features 
in the macro-historical development, the following chapter will analyse the regime building 
and consolidation during the Stroessner regime. 
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3 CHAPTER 3: BUILDING AND CONSOLIDATING THE 
STROESSNER REGIME 1954 – 1989: IN PERSPECTIVE OF 
AGRARIAN LEGISLATION 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In 1963 a new agrarian legislation was implemented in Paraguay through the passing of two 
new laws. Law 854/63 created the Agrarian Statute and Law 852/63 established the Institute 
of Rural Welfare. Together with the National Constitution of 1967, these laws would 
constitute the legal and institutional foundation for agricultural regulation under the 
Stroessner regime.
96
 The agrarian legislation under Stroessner has attracted broad interest 
from academics and research organsations.
97
 However, so far scholars have tended to 
emphasise and argue its socioeconomic developmental effects, placing little focus on any 
political value inherent.    
 
 
In the legal positivistic perspective, as mentioned in the introduction chapter, the origin and 
nature of any legislation corresponds with the framework from which it is created. Law is 
created to address a specific subject and has a specific purpose, and is the result of decision 
making conducted within a particular set of social rules.
98
 In authoritarian regimes the 
intention and function of legislation cannot be understood as aiming at considering any 
common good or interest as the ruling elite is not generated and maintained by popular 
consent, but through alliances between central power holders and the use of various control 
mechanisms. On the contrary, as the weak structure of authoritarian systems generates the 
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need to constantly enforce and reinsure the arrangements in which they are vested. Legislation 
tends to serve a useful tool in this process, designed and created within the limits of what is 
considered necessary for the further existence and consolidation of the regime.
99
 The 
rationality of law within this framework must therefore primarily be understood through its 
political value. Adopting such a political perspective, this chapter examines the agrarian 
legislation implemented under Stroessner. Hence, the chapter addresses the first of the 
secondary research questions asked in this thesis; how and why can agrarian legislation be 
interpreted as a political instrument in the search of regime building and consolidation under 
the Stroessner regime?  
 
 
In addressing this research questions, a chronological approach to the agrarian legislation 
implemented under Stroessner is adopted. Thus, the chapter is organised into four sections. 
The analysis starts by identifying the key serious agrarian problems existing in the early years 
of the dictatorship. Seen in the context of agriculture‟s crucial role as the economic and social 
cornerstone in the Paraguayan society, these problems urged for for measures to be taken. 
Second, the chapter addresses the initiative and the process of implementing a new agrarian 
legislation. Here, special heed will be paid to discussing the character of the process in 
relation to the decision making system under Stroessner and the possibility for participation 
and influencing of interest groups within this structure. Furthermore, the chapter continues by 
analysing the rationality in the agrarian legislation implemented in 1963 and in the agrarian 
articles in the national Constitution of 1967 by examining how the regulations latent in the 
legislation functioned as a political tool for the Paraguayan government. This third section 
will represent the predominant part of the analysis in the chapter. Finally, the chapter shortly 
discusses the consequences of this legislation as a component in the downfall of the 
Stroessner regime. 
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3.2 Rural Problems in the Early Years of the Stroessner Regime; the 
Need for a New Agrarian Legislation 
 
During the early years of the Stroessner regime it soon became clear that there were 
substantial and escalating problems in the Paraguayan countryside. Various scholars have 
explained the situation primarily to be the consequences of the highly skewed pattern of land 
distribution in the country, further complicated by the lack of secure property titles.
100
 
Annelies Zoomers and Luis A. Galeano argue in their studies of rural development in 
Paraguay that the rural problems in this period were primarily to be found in the historically 
populous Central Region
101
 of the country.
102
 While the rest of Paraguay remained thinly 
populated, overpopulation had become the case in this area by the end of the 1950s after the 
population having been in constant increase since the end of the 19
th
 century. However, 
despite the growing population density, the area of land cultivated in the region remained 
more or less the same. Data from the 1956 Agricultural Census indicates that the majority of 
campesinos in the area were living out of parcels of five hectares or less.
103
 Putting an 
immense pressure on the available agrarian resources, the level of possible exploitation of 
these parcels was in the 1950s close to reaching its limits.
104
 The situation may bear 
resemblance to Malthusian theory which states that the population in a society has a tendency 
to grow faster than the available resources.
105
 
 
Zoomers argue that absorption of the overpopulation in the region was hindered by a 
combination of several factors. The primary factor was of a structural character, consisting in 
the distored distribution of land both outside and inside the region. Outside, the controlling of 
the surrounding land by private latifundistas and the Paraguayan state explains largely why 
the population did not move out of the region, thus accelerating the process of minifundism. 
Inside of the region, large areas of unused land within the most populated areas were 
concentrated on only a few hands and out of reach for the growing group of minifundistas.  
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The use of a system of partial inheritance contributed the further division of land was, so did 
the lack of work opportunities outside the agricultural sector.
106
  
 
Moreover, according to Klaus Deininger in his book Land Policies for Growth and Poverty 
Reduction, when population density hinders a further division of land, existing plots have to 
be cultivated as intensively as possible and the need for new and more effective ways of 
cultivation becomes pressing.
107
 However, Zoomers points out in her study that in the 
beginning of the 1960s overuse of land in the Central Region had already led to an extreme 
soil impoverishment and rural poverty, making access to new land and of crucial concern. An 
important part of this problem was, as mentioned above, the campesinos‟ lack of title deeds to 
their land. Deininger argues how unsecured private property rights tend to hinder the 
investments necessary for the introduction of better techniques and methods that could 
improve soil fertility and increase the production per hectare. Contributing to the matter was 
the without formal ownership of land, the campesinos were excluded from access to official 
credit, which led to capital shortage.
108
 During the first years of the Stroessner regime the 
problems in the Central Region evolved into a crisis, materialising itself in increasing levels 
of rural poverty.
109
 The problems in the Paraguayan countryside generated severe social, 
economic and political implications at a national level, as will be elaborated in the following 
sections. 
 
 
3.2.1 Stagnation in the Agricultural Sector 
 
The agrarian problems was perceived by the Paraguayan government to be primarily the result 
of the above mentioned land distribution.
110
 On a general basis, the minifundia-latifundia 
system was considered as highly economically inefficient by Latin American policy makers 
and rural development experts in this period. The core of the problem was thought to be the 
                                                     
106
 Zoomers 1988: 15-18. 
107
 Deininger 2003: 10. 
108
 Deininger 2003: 10;Zoomers 1988: 19-21; Kleinpenning 1984: 165. 
109
 Zoomers 1988: 15; Brunstein Alegre 2008: 343-344. 
110
 Zoomers 1988: 13. 
42 
 
inefficient use of both capital and labour. While the latifundias, with their large tracts of 
underexploited and unused land, generated low levels of productivity per hectare, the 
minifundias were low in labour productivity.
111
 Moreover, the decrease in external demand 
for agricultural products after the Second World War gave further impetus to the downwards 
spiral of the sector – and thus the Paraguayan economy.112 
 
As mentioned in chapter two, the agrarian sector was the main engine of growth in Paraguay‟s 
national economy. The sector therefore was a vital source in the distribution of wealth and 
resources to key political actors in the regime, hence the powerful rural elite and members of 
the Armed Forces.
113
 Thus, combating the stagnation in the agricultural sector became crucial 
in securing the continuing political support from these groups. In order to stimulate the 
agricultural productivity and thereby generating further economic growth the government 
sought to restructure the distribution of land in the country.
114
 Furthermore, the government 
started exploring new ventures in order to provide income compensation to the rural elite as 
foreign demand for the traditional Paraguayan produce was in decline. The government was 
in particular optimistic about the prospects of what was regarded as newfound economic 
opportunities in the eastern border of the country, setting up new modes of agricultural 
production by emulating techniques and methods in Brazilian large scale farming. An added 
benefit, and one not to be underestimated in this case, was that such an eastwards expansion 
also implied a diversification of Paraguay‟s economical dependence on Argentina.115 
 
Stroessner gained support from the Paraguayan society from his ability to provide order, and 
stability, peace, and socioeconomic development to a country that in the previous decades had 
been plagued with disorder, political chaos and economic instability and downturns.
116
 The 
importance of agriculture to the economy, the predominant rural population pattern and the 
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social structure thus made it paramount to the Paraguayan government to address and solve 
the agrarian problems to secure the future existence of the regime.
117
  
 
 
 
3.2.2 Fear of Rural Political Unrest 
 
The serious situation for the campesinos in the Central Region manifested itself through a 
rising demand for land, leading to conflicts and tension in the countryside.
118
 Facing a 
potential nationwide escalation of unrest that could seriously threaten the political stability in 
the country, the government was more or less forced to take action.
119
 
 
The state of agitation in the Paraguayan countryside and the government‟s response to this has 
to be understood in a wider historical context. International events such as the Cuban 
revolution in 1959 created an ambiance of fear among the right wing political forces in the 
Latin American hemisphere for the spread of revolution and socialism. The conservative 
oriented Stroessner regime was no exception. The political drama in Latin America was 
unfolding within a bi-polar world order, and the United States government found the situation 
called for intervention. Fearing a loss of dominance and the hampering of US interests in the 
region, the Kennedy administration took command of the counter-measures against this 
perceived threat through the creation of the Alliance for Progress programme in 1961. This 
programme was an effort to establish economic cooperation between the northern and the 
southern parts of the American continents. As the impoverishment of the largely rural Latin 
American population was thought to have a direct influence on the socialist expansion, the 
Alliance for Progress provided aid to the Latin American governments encouraging the 
implementation of agrarian reforms.
120
 Also the Paraguayan government was offered 
economical assistance for the implementation of a new agrarian policy through this 
                                                     
117
 Zoomers 1988: 12-13; Galeano 1991: 41; World Bank 1992: 2; Kleinpenning 1984: 164-166. 
118
 Galeano 1991: 42. 
119
 Zoomers 1988: 3, 13. 
120
 Kay 1998: 4; Rivarola y Galeano 1998: 129. 
44 
 
programme.
121
 With this, the focus will now turn to examining the process of implementing 
and shaping the new agrarian strategy. 
 
 
 
 
3.3 The Law Making Process 
 
The 1963 agrarian legislation was shaped within a political system where policymaking, 
according to economist José Molinas et al. in their research paper concerning political 
institutions and policymaking in Paraguay, was characterised by a rigid structure of high 
levels of control and with a strong independence between policy adaptability and public 
regardedness.
122
 Changes in the status quo were first and foremost to be conducted in relation 
to what was perceived as necessary for the existence and strengthening of the regime as a 
whole. Molinas et al. argues that policies under the Stroessner regime in a large extent were 
designed with the purpose to benefit loyal members of the regime. Though, in the first two 
decades of the dictatorship some extensive national policies were implemented that would 
also benefit the public as an attempt of generating mass acceptance. The agrarian legislation 
can be interpreted to fit this category. According to sociologist Carlos Miranda such policies 
were implemented as measures that concurrently would benefit Stroessner‟s political 
supporters and keep any opponents at bay.
123
  
 
In practice the initiative to all policymaking under the Stroessner regime was to come from 
the Executive branch of government in accordance with an arrangement between the two 
other main political actors of the regime, the Colorado Party and the Armed Forces. The 
Congress in this period, maintained as a democratic facade, was therefore no important arena 
for the initiation of new legislation. The institution held no real veto power, at the same time 
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as Stroessner‟s strong and unified Colorado Party always was guaranteed a majority in voting. 
The legislators were recruited from the line of loyal politicians to the president, and were 
expected to be supportive to any suggestion coming their way.
124
 Nonetheless, according to 
Molinas et al, the Congress represented several political capacities beyond serving as a 
democratic façade. The authors emphasise how the Congress was an important instrument in 
organising and controlling any existing opposition through the ability to co-opt, bribe, or 
repress dissatisfied social actors into accepting new policies.
125
 Opposition under Stroessner 
was customarily weak, though limited political activity was allowed and organised through 
selected political parties – mainly through the traditional Liberal Party and the left-wing 
Febrerista Party. This opposition was allowed access to Congress. However, there was also an 
illegal opposition, primarily represented by the Cristian Democratic Party, the Communist 
Party, and the Popular Colorado Movement. These parties were perceived as subversive and 
dangerous and thus object to heavy repression, as were existing interest groups in form of 
student organisation, various labour unions, intellectual circles and the Catholic Church.
126
 
 
 
The first initiative to create a new agrarian legislation during Stroessner‟s rule came from the 
Paraguayan government with the collaboration of the United Nation‟s Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) through the Primary National Seminar of Agrarian Reform in 
Paraguay
127
  in the period between the 24
th
 of June and the 24
th
 of July 1958. The aim of the 
seminar was to replace the Agrarian Statute of 1940 with a new agrarian legislation 
containing the capacity to simultaneously address the precarious situation for the campesinos 
in the country and the stagnation in the agrarian sector, as well as functioning as an instrument 
of control to the government. Numerous Paraguayan and foreign experts were taking part in 
the process, but no representatives of the large group of campesinos in the country were 
invited to the seminar.
128
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Though rural conflict and unrest during the first years of the Stroessner regime had 
contributed in putting rural development on the agenda, the implementation of the new 
agrarian legislation was thus not a result from any direct social pressure from below. The last 
serious conflict in the countryside came in 1960 as an attempt to create a general uprising 
against the dictatorship, organised by exiled members of the Liberal Party, the Febreristas, 
and the Communist Party. The attempt never materialised, but lead to a wave of brutal 
repression of campesinos assumed to have connections with these parties.  
 
The event pacified the countryside.
129
 However, in the early 1960s, rural opposition shifted 
from being rooted in party politics towards being organised and backed the Catholic Church. 
This was one of the few organisations in the Paraguayan society with some leeway against the 
Stroessner regime. In 1962 the Catholic Church founded the Christian Agrarian Leagues 
(LAC) in an attempt to raise the level of political awareness of the campesino situation. 
However, the LACs were met with intense violence and repression from the government, 
leaving the campesinos in the country with no political bargaining power to influence the 
character of the 1963 agrarian legislation.
130
 Moreover, a general attempt during the 
Stroessner regime to pacify and draw support from the countryside came from the activities of 
the omnipresent Colorado Party in the Paraguayan society. The local Colorado-offices 
dominated throughout the countryside political, economic, and social life, ensuring rural 
support and loyalty through the workings of political and economic patronage. The offices 
functioned simultaniously as the eyes and the ears of the government, reporting of deviant and 
anti-regime sentiments among the rural population.
131
 
 
The low public consideration demonstrated in the legislation process of the new agrarian laws 
through the exclusion of campesino interests in the decision making, indicates that the new 
laws indeed were implemented and designed in accordance with the controlling elite‟s 
preferences for the regime. Political scientists Riordan Roett and historian Richard Scott 
Sacks points out in their historical book, Paraguay the Personalist Legacy that within 
societies where patron-client relations are widely used in political life, the control by the 
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political elite over resources are crucial in their function as exchange for political support.
132
 
In such, agriculture being a vital source for the gaining of economic wealth by powerful 
groups in the Paraguayan society, the implementation of the new agrarian legislation in 1963 
can be interpreted as an attempt from the government in gaining control over the country‟s 
agricultural resources.  
 
 
 
 
3.4 The Agrarian Legislation as an Political Instrument 
 
 
3.4.1 Official Objectives: Rural Welfare and National Economic Growth and 
Development 
 
Responding to the immediate rural problems that existed in the early years of the Stroessner 
regime, two major objectives can be identified when analysing the 1963 agrarian legislation –
the promotion of rural welfare and national economic growth and development. Perceived to 
be intrinsically connected, one goal could not be achieved without the other. Moreover, once 
implemented, these objectives were thought to have a mutual reinforcing effect. Thus, one set 
of measures was adopted in order to achieve both targets.  
 
Rural welfare, as defined in the legislation, consisted in the transformation of the agrarian 
structure of the country, obtained through the incorporation of the campesino population into 
the national economic and social development. Primarily this was to be achieved by 
developing a more just system of land distribution through reduced concentration of 
landownership and displacing the prevailing latifundia-minifundia structure. The measures 
established in the 1963 Agrarian Statute to secure this objective was a colonisation of 
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underexploited and unused land as well as the regulation and restructuring of already 
cultivated agricultural land. As these measures were believed to improve the situation for the 
rural population, they would also stimulate economic growth in the agricultural sector, which 
again would promote further rural prosperity.
133
   
 
The Agrarian Statute also entailed the establishing of a scheme where the interior and eastern 
part of the country was to be colonised. This program had two officially defined objectives. 
The first ambition was to improve the geographical distribution of the rural population and 
thus their economic and social welfare, in particular the situation for the campesinos in the 
Central Region.
134
 Though not stated as an official goal in the new legislation it is reason to 
assume that generating of a migration flow towards the Brazilian border also was established 
with the purpose of taking advantage of the earlier mentioned economic opportunities in this 
part of the country.  
 
The second aim of the colonisation program was transforming new and underused land into 
economically rational exploitations.
135
 In short, economic rationality can be defined as the 
action of reaching something‟s maximal potential.136 A rational exploitation, as to be 
understood in the legislation, referred to reaching maximum agrarian productivity through the 
effective production of agrarian goods according to the nature and typography of the 
agricultural land. With the use of this principle the Agrarian Statute promoted the establishing 
of three types of agricultural colonies depending on their geographical location in the country. 
First of all, preference was to be given to the establishing of crop and general farm 
colonies.
137
 The minimum size for the lots engaged in this type of agriculture was set to 20 
hectares. Second, the law promoted the formation of crop and forest product colonies on land 
suitable for cultivation of various crops, mixed livestock, combined with intensive 
exploitation of woodlands. These colonies had a minimum size limit of 50 hectares. Both 
types of colonies had a maximum size level of 100 hectares. Finally, the law encouraged the 
creation of colonies of livestock farming to be intensively exploited through the use of 
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artificial pastures and improvement of livestock. Lands designated for such use were to be 
divided in respectively 300 to 1500 hectares and 1500 to 8000 hectares depending on the 
geographical location.
138
  
 
 
Assisting the colonisation process was the establishing of programs of technical and social 
assistance, titling, crediting, and introduction of new methods for production.
139
 The officially 
stated beneficiaries of the colonisation were Paraguayans over 18 years, dedicated to 
agricultural and livestock production or those who formally declare themselves to become 
dedicated to such forms of activity. However, in order to qualify for a parcel of land in the 
official colonies one had to be under 65 years of age. Crucially, foreigners fulfilling these 
requirements were considered beneficiaries under equal conditions as Paraguayans. Each 
beneficiary was entitled to at least one parcel of land in accordance with the specific set of 
regulations introduced above. Securing a minimum level of rural welfare was the priority in 
the granting of land to the beneficiaries with the fewest resources and largest families.
140
 
Whether through official programs or on private initiative colonisation was put under the 
responsibility of the newly established IBR, provided with wide authorities in terms of the 
more specific organisation and regulation of colonisation. Land subject to colonisation was 
state-owned land in the possession of the IBR, or private land not effectively exploited and 
suitable for settlement and agricultural activity attained either through sale or expropriation.
141
  
 
 
As mentioned above, the second measure in transforming the skewed distribution of was 
through the regulation and restructuring of privately owned property outside the colonisation 
areas. The statute provided minimum and maximum limits for the size of the properties. 
Agricultural lots were to be no less than two hectares within suburban zones, and minimum 
seven hectares in rural areas. Minifundias under the given size were objects to expropriation 
by the state and should be unified into new parcels of land and resold. As compensation, the 
former owners of the expropriated lots were to be first priority in acquiring a new piece of 
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land in the nearest official colony.
142
 In comparison to the regulations in earlier legislation, 
this minimum size level was considerably higher.
143
 As discussed earlier, most small farmers 
in Paraguay at the time, especially in the Central Region, were estimated to be in position of 
less than five hectares. Latifundias, defined as large tracts of properties low in intensive and 
efficient use of the land, were targets of expropriation if exceeding 10 000 hectares in the 
eastern part of Paraguay and 20 000 hectares in the western region of Paraguay, the Chaco.
144
 
Hence, this left all rationally exploited farms, effective and intensive in use, over the given 
size out of the scoop of regulation, as well as all farms with less than 10 000 and 20 000 
hectares.  
 
 
In an overall perspective, both the colonisation programme and the restructuring of agrarian 
properties outside the colonisation areas can be interpreted as having a principally technical 
and economically directed character. In sum, the regulation in the agrarian legislation held 
prospects of both intensive (more efficient use of existing resources), and extensive (increase 
in available resources) growth. In a wider context this regulation can be understood as part of 
a general trend in the Latin American rural development policies in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
mail goal of these policies was to create more efficient and modernised agricultural sectors. 
Following such agrarian strategies, land was not primarily redistributed to the campesino 
populations as a means of stimulating social development, but transformed into efficient 
middle-sized capitalist farms thought to provide a far bigger agricultural output than what had 
been the case within the old latifundia-minifundia structure. The restructuring of land was 
always accompanied by the introduction of mechanisation and new technology. Expropriation 
of land was in this strategy designed and used as a threat that would push the large 
landowners into making the necessary technical and economical changes. Furthermore, in 
order to avoid expropriation landowners often subdivided their estates among family 
members, speeding up the development of a middle-sized farms sector.
145
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To summarise, this section has demonstrated how the agrarian legislation implemented in 
1963 addressed and aimed at solving the rural problems threatening the existence of the 
young Stroessner regime through the promotion of rural welfare and economical growth and 
development. The following section will provide a further analysis of how the agrarian 
legislation functioned as a fundament in the consolidation and longevity of the regime. 
 
 
  
3.4.2 Rewarding Political Supporters and Avoiding Peasant Conflict; a Balancing of 
Interest 
 
3.4.2.1 Elite Interests 
 
A vital part of the success of the Stroessner regime has been explained by the dictator‟s ability 
of balancing and merging elite interests and the acceptance of the masses.
146
 The case of the 
agrarian legislation supports this view and will be discussed in the following. 
 
 
The relation between the rural elite and the Paraguayan government took place within the 
clientilistic structures existing at all levels of the regime, which rested upon the distribution of 
economic and political benefits to the elite in return for political support and legitimacy.
147
 
Invigorating economic development through the agrarian legislation can be interpreted as an 
effort directly addressed towards the powerful rural elite. As mentioned before, a more 
efficient organised agricultural sector would increase the profitability of the elite‟s existing 
activities, whilst the colonisation process towards the Brazilian border provided the large 
landowners with an increase in their income generating basis. In particular, the process laid 
the grounds for an expansion in new export crops such as soya and cotton in the 1970s.
148
 
Data from 1987 indicates that soya and cotton had grown to comprise respectively 38% and 
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34% of the country‟s exports.149 At the beginning of the 1960s, the agrarian sector recovered 
from stagnation and experienced a relatively high growth rate until recession once again 
became evident in the early 1980s.
150
 Furthermore, the benefits of the growth in the 
agricultural sector were not shared by the rural masses, as poverty continued to increase in the 
same period.
151
 Hence, it reason to assume that the agricultural surplus that had been 
generated mainly was absorbed by the rural elite in the country. 
 
 
Not only stimulating higher levels of income, the regulations in the 1963 agrarian legislation 
also provided the opportunity for the allocation of new land in the established colonies to 
political supporters, distributed by legal means through the IBR. In particular, established by 
law in the 1963 Agrarian Statute was the distribution of land to the regime‟s most powerful 
political support group, the Armed Forces, stating that discharged servicemen had the right to 
acquire of a parcel of agricultural land with the best possible terms of payment.
152
 As 
discussed in a previous section of the chapter the legislation offered a precise regulation of 
who were to benefit from the colonisation programme, as well as who did not. In acquiring a 
parcel designated for crop and general farming or forestry, land was only to be granted to 
persons already owning less than 50 hectares. Requiring land for livestock production one had 
to be in the possession of less than 300 hectares in the eastern region of the country, and less 
than 1500 hectares in the western region.
153
 Nonetheless, the regulations also opened up for 
the possibility of arbitrage in land. In special cases and on petition from the IBR to the 
Executive Power, colonised land might be sold on to non-beneficiaries of the legislation.
154
 Of 
particular importance was a clause, which allowed selling properties larger than the maximum 
size established for the different colonial lots.
155
  
 
 
Opening up for this kind of sale of land supports the notion of the new agrarian legislation as 
an important tool in the distribution of resources to political supporters. It also suggests the 
importance of such a distribution to be legitimised and justified through law seen in 
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perspective of the notion that agricultural land was a highly demanded asset by different 
social groupings in the Paraguayan society. Further support of the political mechanisms of the 
legislation, can be found in the wide jurisdiction designated to the organisation in charge of 
executing the new regulations, the IBR. Equipped with only vague directions, it was up to the 
IBR itself to define and conduct decisions in relation to the colonisation programme and the 
redefining of the land distribution system. 
  
 
As the IBR was established as an autonomous institute, it had only a loose chain of 
responsibility in relation to the rest of the state institutions, and thus few control routines in its 
decision making.
156
 This left the IBR as a useful tool in which the distribution of resources to 
political supporters of the regime could be legally channelised. Research strongly indicate that 
despite the huge tracts of land distributed by the IBR during the years of the Stroessner 
regime, only a diminutive amount had benefited the campesinos. Rather, through the use of 
various irregular means, land was distributed in large amounts to members of the Armed 
Forces and other high governmental officials, the rural elite, and members of the Stroessner 
family. Moreover, large tracts of land were acquired by foreign corporations and land 
speculators.
157
 Examining the effects of the agrarian strategy implemented in 1963, research 
demonstrate that the minifundia-latifundia structure in the country not only to a large extent 
had prevailed, with the exception of the emergence of a small middle sized farm sector, but 
the minifundia-latifundia structure was also to be found in the colonisation areas.
158
 Tomás 
Palau supports this notion by pointing out that the colonisation had resulted in a re-
concentration of land, and thereby increased the level of latifundism.
159
 
 
 
Finally, the legislation can also be interpreted as offering a strong defence of private property 
through protecting the latifundias in the country, in what Tomás Palau has called a social 
exclusion of the campesino population.
160
 The first article of the Agrarian Statute clearly 
states the legal protection of private property of the rural estate on the grounds of its function 
in promoting rural welfare and economic growth through the efficient and rational 
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exploitation of the land.
161
 However, as discussed earlier, the regulation of the land 
distribution in the 1963 legislation left few latifundias subject to expropriation, rationally 
exploited or not. Research indicates that this also turned out to be the reality. According to 
sociologist Ramón Fogel, the IBR‟s interpretation of the agrarian legislation strongly 
favoured the latifundistas.
162
 Zoomers argues in her study that almost none of the latifundia-
land had been regulated and redistributed through expropriation after the 1963 legislation was 
endorsed. Zoomers also challenged claim put forward by the Paraguayan government on the 
scale and scope of the expropriation. An official statement argued that up to 1976, the IBR 
had expropriated 45 latifundias with a total area of 4.3 million hectares.
163
 According to 
Zoomers these figures were misleading as most of the properties had been sold to the IBR 
voluntarily by the owners.
164
 Moreover, she argues, most of the colonisation in this period 
actually was a result of private initiative and not through the official colonisation programme 
promulgated in the Agrarian Statute. On a general basis, the colonisation programme 
implemented in 1963 with is distributive measures, in practice mainly of already state owned 
or voluntarily sold land, can be interpreted as a means of avoiding any major redistributive 
land reform as a solution to the rural problems in the country that could negatively affect the 
country‟s powerful landowning class.   
 
 
 
 
3.4.2.2 Avoiding Campesino Uprising and the Search for Mass Acceptance 
 
The promotion and stimulating of rural development in the country was crucial to the 
Stroessner regime in several respects. It was perceived as a precondition of further economic 
growth and as a means of alleviating the immediate situation in the Central region by 
promising new land and new job opportunities in the area towards the Brazilian border, in 
such avoiding rural uprisings that in any way could threaten the existence of the regime. 
Furthermore, rural development and prosperity was also considered a measure in creating a 
more stable structure in the countryside. How Stroessner managed to create an agrarian 
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legislation which at the same time balanced elite interests and the needs of the masses of 
Paraguayan small farmers can to a large extent be explained in the wide use of rhetoric 
imbedded in it. As the Paraguayan lawyer and historian Carlos Pastore emphasised in his 
1972 analysis of the fight for land in Paraguay, an important measure was taken in the 1963 
Agrarian Statute through releasing the government from the responsibility of having to carry 
out any wide spread redistribution of land in the country. This was done, as Pastore points out, 
by replacing the term „agrarian reform‟ in the former Agrarian Statute of 1940 with the more 
vague term „rural welfare‟ in the 1963 Agrarian Statute. The same measure is also visible in 
the replacing of the institute in charge executing agrarian policy in the country, the existing 
Institute of Agrarian Reform with the new Institute of Rural Welfare.
165
 The importance of the 
semantics in the agrarian legislation under Stroessner is also emphasised by J.M.G. 
Kleinpenning in his study Man and Land in Paraguay.
166
 
 
In the National Constitution of 1967, however, agrarian reform was established as a 
fundamental requirement in obtaining rural development. Moreover, the Constitution 
established a reaffirming of the historical legal tradition ensuring the right for every 
Paraguayan family own a piece of land..
167
 By affirming the use of agrarian reform in the 
Constitution, the Stroessner regime sent a message to the Paraguayan people that the 
problems in the countryside and the interests of the large group of small farmers in the 
country was taken seriously and that something was being done. However, the Constitution 
further defined agrarian reform as being achieved through the exact same measures as in the 
1963 Agrarian Statute, the effective incorporation of the rural population into the national 
economic and social development.
168
   
 
In an effort to reach out to the people of Paraguay, agricultural related issues were also 
commented on a daily basis in the national newspapers. As the media was controlled by or run 
directly by the government, the communication through these channels needs to be 
understood as an instrument in Stroessner‟s widespread manipulation of the Paraguayan 
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population.
169
 In analysing articles concerning agrarian issue in the „independent‟ newspaper 
La Tribuna, in the 1960s, the character of the articles can be described as all giving a highly 
positive image of the rural situation in the country. Rural problems were noted to exist, but 
they were always reported to be thoroughly analysed, under control and solutions provided by 
the government. The articles primarily provided news form the colonisation frontier about 
new parcels of land ready to be distributed, or about the life of the pioneers. The articles 
commented upon latifundias expropriated and about the titling of land to small farmers in 
different regions of the country. Of particular interest is that fact that in all the articles 
analysed, the term „agrarian reform‟ was used instead of „rural welfare‟.170  
 
In addition to the articles, the newspapers also contained advertisings of rural development 
programmes stating the regimes achievements as well as the further goals for the years ahead. 
This is illustrated in the image on the page below, which is an advertising of the government‟s 
program of titling of land. In large writing the advertisement informs that between 1985 and 
1989 the Stroessner Government would provide one million properties to one million people. 
Below, it informs that in 1984 there existed a total of 855 962 properties in the country. In the 
years between 1985 and 1989 the Stroessner Government would thus increase this number by 
establishing 144 038 properties more. As a conclusion, on the background of the above 
discussion the rhetoric imbedded in the legislation needs to be understood as an attempt to 
justify and legitimise its regulations towards the large group of campesinos in the country. 
This gave the legislation a character of populism, in what can be understood as a search for 
mass acceptance and the avoidance of rural uprisings. 
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Image 3.1 Propaganda on titling of agricultural land from the IBR. Source: Zoomers 1988: 123. 
 
 
 
3.5.2 The Legislation as an Instrument of Control 
 
Control is a prerequisite for the existence and survival of any authoritarian regime as its very 
definition rests upon consisting of concentrated and highly centralised power structures 
through the use of power and alliance building, repression and exclusion of political 
challengers. Within such structures the attempt to impose high levels of control in all elements 
of society constitutes a vital component.
171
 As emphasised in chapter two the Stroessner 
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regime used a wide range of control mechanisms embracing every aspect of the Paraguayan 
society.
172
 In an overall view the regulations in the agrarian legislation can be understood as 
such a mechanism in an effort to gain control of the country‟s agricultural resources as well as 
the beneficiaries of these reserves. The law making process constituted a first attempt in this 
direction, organising and gaining insight in the agrarian interests in the country, making it 
possible to constrain any contradicting opinions through repression and co-opting.  
 
 
The agrarian legislation that was implemented provided control over agrarian resources and 
beneficiaries in several ways. Primarily, this was done through the detailed definitions and 
regulations of the law‟s beneficiaries, size of land, and type of production in an attempt of 
steering the agrarian sector into the wanted direction. What is striking is however that the 
legislation constituted a means of controlling both official and private colonisation as well as 
the restructuring of private land, providing the government with a firm grip over practically 
all agricultural land within the country. At the same time, giving the IBR wide authorities in 
the more specific and practical decisions in relation to the legislation, and by placing the 
institute out of the reach of regulation by other governmental bodies, meant that policy in 
practise more or less could take form according to the immediate necessity of the regime. 
 
 
Furthermore, according to Brian Turner in his article on peasant-state relations in Paraguay 
the agrarian legislation under Stroessner was part of an effort to extend state power and 
control in the rural society. Turner argues that the 1963 Agrarian Statute through its 
regulations fundamentally altered the social relations in the countryside by making the 
campesinos dependent on the government.
173
 Turner emphasises the situation in the new 
colonies, arguing that the settlements were organised in a way that made the inhabitants 
strongly dependable of the regime, ensuring a hierarchical relationship between the local elite 
and the pioneers through the patrimonial channels of the Colorado Party.
174
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In its ultimate expression the agrarian legislation under Stroessner can be understood as an 
instrument of control not only through putting the agrarian resources and its beneficiaries 
under firm state regulation, but also through generating political stability and legitimacy to the 
regime as suggested in the analysis of this chapter. 
 
 
 
  
 
3.6 The Agrarian Situation and the Downfall of Stroessner 
 
As outlined in the second chapter, the beginning of the 1980s marked the start of a series of 
political, economical and social challenges that eventually lead to the demise of the Stroessner 
regime in 1989. The situation in the agrarian sector and in the rural society in general 
constituted an important component in this development. In the beginning of the 1980s 
recession once again became evident in the agricultural sector, mainly due to falling 
international prices on vital exports products such as soy beans and cotton.
175
 The problems in 
the agricultural sector created doubts about the agrarian policies pursued by the regime. In a 
system founded on distributing benefits, continuing economic growth in the agricultural 
sector was, as during the recession in the early years of the Stroessner regime discussed in the 
beginning of this chapter, a paramount for the continuing political support from the rural 
elite.
176
 Contributing to the deteriorating situation in the agrarian sector was the decline in 
agricultural land available to the state to distribute to its supporters.
177
 
 
 
Moreover, as argued by Zoomers the colonisation process initiated by the 1963 legislation did 
in practice not resulted in any significant improvement for the country‟s campesinos. First of 
all, the majority of the minifundistas in the Central Region did not move out, thus resulting in 
little improvement in the land distribution in this overpopulated area.
178
 Comparing data from 
the 1956 and the 1991 Agrarian Censuses indicate that the skewed distribution of land also at 
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a national level had not improved during the Stroessner regime.
179
 Second, the conditions for 
the campesinos in the new colonies were poor due to insufficient technical and social 
assistance in cultivating the new lots, and the failing to receive property titles to their land by 
the IBR.  Worsening the situation for the campesinos in the colonisation areas was the arrival 
in the 1970s by large groups of foreign investors establishing agro-businesses.
180
  
 
 
 
In the final years of the Stroessner regime the conditions in the new colonies in particular 
gave rise to growing dissatisfaction among the campesinos in the country and an 
intensification of rural conflicts.
181
 The changes in the socio-political context had lead to 
splits within the ruling power block which created a political environment opening for civic 
action. In this context, several campesino movements formed outside of the regime‟s 
traditional clientilistic structures, backed notably by the Catholic Church.
182
 International 
development agencies and non-governmental organisation also appeared within this new 
political climate, supporting grassroots and community organisations and providing valuable 
training for campesino leaders.
183
 This development would lay the ground for the campesino 
movement‟s activities and participation in the democratisation process taking place after 
Stroessner‟s downfall in 1989. 
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4 CHAPTER 4: THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS 1989 – 
2008; IN PERSPECTIVE OF AGRARIAN LEGISLATION 
 
 
 
Image 4.1. The image illustrates the ambivalent sentiments present in the Paraguayan rural society in the 
immediate aftermath of Stroessner’s downfall,  the man on the left side of the image expressing joy over the 
ending of the dictatorship, singing “how nice, nice, nice, how nice, nice is the campesino life when Stroessner 
now is gone,”  while the other man on the right side expresses his uncertainty of  what the future will bring for 
the campesinos in the country by asking the questions “what about salary, what about agrarian reform, what 
about health, what about education, what about…”. Source: Informativo Campesino No. 5, 1989. 
 
Stroessner‟s downfall in February 1989 brought the Paraguayan nation into a collective shock 
and bewilderment about the future. Stroessner had become the symbol of Paraguay, and after 
almost thirty five years of dictatorship nearly 75% of the country‟s population knew no other 
reality.
184
 Chapter four has outlined how the situation had deteriorated for the large group of 
campesinos despite three decades of colonisation policy. The sentiments of ambiguity about 
what to expect were thus also present in the countryside, as illustrated in the image above. 
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The military coup of General Andrés Rodríguez prompted an unexpected transition towards 
democracy in Paraguay with the opening of democratic elections, the introduction of political 
rights, and the promises of further reforms.
185
 With the political changeover came new 
questions, especially as Paraguay had no former democratic history. As defined in the 
introduction chapter, in principle, democratisation means the introduction of new rules to the 
political game. The process should increased participation in the political decision making by 
members of society. It also implies that decisions made are consistent with the needs and 
requirements of the people concerned. Moreover, democratisation includes the building of 
democratic institutions and that the political actors respect and follow the rules imbedded in 
these.
186
 However, the building of institutions and integration of new political actors takes 
time and, perhaps most importantly, it often unfolds within the remnants of the previous 
political structures and traditions. 
 
This chapter examines the democratisation process in Paraguay between 1989 and 2008, 
focusing on the agrarian question, which maintained its vital position on the national political 
agenda. In contrast to the Stroessner era, the agrarian question now changed from mainly 
being a matter for the ruling elite, to become more democratic and multifaceted. In its 
ultimate and most compound expression, the agrarian question in this period was ventilated 
through a demand of an updated and more democratic agrarian legislation in the shape of 
agrarian reform. This was a demand put forward by the campesinos and landless in the 
country, a majority group in the Paraguayan society that entered with great intensity on to the 
new political stage emerging after 1989.
187
 
 
However, a new agrarian statute was not implemented until 2002, followed by the replacing 
of the IBR with the National Institute of Rural Development and Land (INDERT) in 2004. 
How could a legislation implemented under an authoritarian regime, perceived to be outdated 
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and undemocratic, able to survive within the emerging democratic system – for a period of 
over thirteen years? 
 
This chapter addresses the second of the subordinate research question in the thesis; how and 
why can the development in the question of a new agrarian legislation be interpreted as an 
expression of the mechanisms at work in the democratisation process in Paraguay? 
 
As in the previous chapter the structure of the analysis follows the chronological development 
in the question of the agrarian legislation in the given period. The chapter identifies and 
discusses four phases within this development. It starts by examining the emergence of the 
campesino organisations within the opening of a civil society as political pressure groups in 
the initial period of democratisation. Second, it identifies and analyse a turning point in the 
legislative development in the period in the creation and inauguration of the 1992 
Constitution. Furthermore, in the third section the chapter aims at explaining the lack of a 
further implementation of an agrarian legislation that would replace the laws from the 
Stroessner era. Finally, the last section analyses the new agrarian legislation established in 
2002 and 2004. Throughout the chapter the question of the agrarian legislation is discussed in 
relation to the development within the democratisation process. Furthermore, the analysis will 
be compared with the findings from the previous chapter concerning the Stroessner regime, in 
such providing a historical long term perspective on the development in question. 
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4.1 Demands for a New Agrarian Legislation 
 
4.1.1 The opening of Civil Society; New Pressure Groups 
 
The initial phase of the democratisation process in Paraguay was characterised by the opening 
of a civil society with the introduction of political rights in form of freedom of speech and 
association, stimulating a burst of political and civic activity in the country.
188
 Despite heavy 
repression, rural conflict had intensified in the final years of the Stroessner regime, making 
the existing campesino organisations in the country ready to take advantage of the situation 
that presented itself in the wake of the 1989 coup. Only days after Stroessner‟s downfall, the 
campesino organisations for the first time in Paraguayan history carried out a national 
mobilisation.
189
  
 
The change towards a political system perceived to be more open and more sympathetic to the 
situation of the campesinos generated a flourishing of new interest organisations. In 1989 
there existed five national campesino organisations.
190
 However, split by ideological believes, 
the number of organisations on a national level had in 1992 increased to ten.
191
 In addition to 
the organisations representing the interests of the campesinos, the latifundistas in the country 
continued to be represented by the traditional Paraguayan Rural Association (ARP) and the 
newly founded the National Organisation of Property owners (ANAPRO).  
 
Moreover, in the first years of the democratisation process the campesino organisations 
started to transform in character, relieving themselves from the close ties to the Catholic 
Church established under the dictatorship and evolving as autonomous organisations 
operating at local, regional and national levels. During this period the organisations gained 
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strength and visability as political actors, resulting in an increasing ability to promote their 
political agenda.
192
 In such, the emergence of a campesino movement in this period can be 
understood as an expression of an actual change in the Paraguayan political structure in the 
opening of a civil society, as well as functioning as a vital component in this process. 
 
 
4.1.2 New Expectations, Rising Demands 
 
Data from the 1991 Agrarian Census indicate that only in the last decade of the Stroessner 
regime the number of minifundias
193
 in Paraguay had increased from 36% to 40%. The same 
census suggests that these farms together controlled only 1% of the country‟s agricultural 
land, equivalent to the data found in the 1956 Agrarian Census.
194
 In other words, this 
indicates that the small parcels of land that were registered in 1956, were even smaller in 
1991. Consequently, there was less land to share among a steadily growing population, and 
the poverty level in the countryside was escalating. Thus, there seems little doubt that the 
situation for the campesinos deteriorated during the Stroessner era.
195
 Hence, with the 
introduction of democratic principles, old demands from the campesinos were revitalised and 
further fuelled by new ones. 
 
As a continuation from the final years of the Stroessner regime, the demand for access to 
agricultural land from the large group of landless rural families
196
 was now swiftly intensified. 
Only hours into the coup in 1989 a landslide of occupations of uncultivated land was 
registered, such as in the region of Alto Paraná where over 200 landless families occupied 
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parts of a latifundio.
197
 During 1989, approximately 90 cases of land conflicts were registered. 
The occupations continued with high intensity in the following years.
198
 These acts 
constituted as the most extreme expression of the needs of the landless families, justified 
through the old usufruct right to land first established in 1904.
199
 This wave of rural activism 
in the primary years after the coup was according to sociologist Beverly Y. Nagel, as she 
points out in her article Rural Violence and Land Rights in Paraguay, exceptional. 
Furthermore, she argues, the occupations must be understood as conscious political acts 
arranged by the campesino organisations, directly connected to the question of legal rights 
and rural developmental policy, and not as opportunistic acts by individuals as some have 
interpreted them.
200
 Moreover, new demands emerged, such as direct participation by 
campesino representatives in government, democratic agrarian politics, real political liberties 
for all rural groups, and the integration of previously marginalised social groups, such as 
women and indigenous people, on to the political arena.
201
  
 
As mentioned earlier, the demands for change put forward in the period of democratisation 
was ultimately a demand for a new agrarian legislation as the laws implemented under the 
Stroessner regime were perceived as outdated and undemocratic.
202
 Since the turn of the 
1990s, the land available for distribution in the frontier region was so limited that the official 
colonisation program established in the 1963 Agrarian Statute in practice was ended.
203
 
Furthermore, the nature of certain articles in the Statute, such as the distribution of land to the 
members of the Armed Forces, as well as age limits on the distribution of colonial lots, were 
perceived by the campesino organisations, a view reflected by various academics in the 
country, as undemocratic and insisted upon to be removed. It was therefore expected that a 
new and more democratic legislation reflecting the interest of the rural population, would 
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accompany the political transformation.
204
 The campesino organisations assumed and 
emphasized in their demands that only an extensive agrarian reform with widespread 
expropriation and redistribution of land could provide the solution needed to solve the 
destitute situation in the countryside. Moreover, the agrarian reform needed to be 
accompanied by the access to technical and financial resources, the creation of infrastructure 
in the campesino communities, the securing of fair prices for the agricultural products based 
on production costs, and the opening and securing of new markets.
205
 Three months after the 
coup in 1989, as part of a campaign for the participation of campesinos in the democratisation 
process (NEIKE), a national seminar concerning the promotion of an agrarian reform was 
conducted with the participation of all the national campesino organisations as a first attempt 
in influencing the implementation of a new legislation.
206
 
 
 
 
4.1.3 New Players, Old Rules? 
 
“The problem of land is going to be an ordeal for the democracy and above all for the 
government of General Rodríguez.”207 
 
Politics in the first years of the democratisation process became increasingly marked by the 
fact that Paraguay was a rural society, as to be understood in the quote presented above from 
one of the initiators of the NEIKE campaign, Mario Melanio Medina in 1989. The problems 
and the demands of the many campesinos and landless families gained increasing visibility 
and strength, and could not be ignored to the same extent as had been the case in the previous 
regime. As part of General Rodríguez presidential election campaign, agrarian reform became 
firmly established on the national political agenda and declared a priority for the new 
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government after Rodrígues won the elections in May, 1989.
208
 As an expression of the 
promises made, the same year a National Council of Rural Development (CONCODER) was 
created with the instructions to promote agrarian reform.
209
 Moreover, in 1990 the Council of 
Rural Development (CDR) was established with the main tasks of coordinating the 
governmental politics on agrarian reform and to analyse the rural situation.
210
  
 
Nonetheless, the campesino organsiations did not gain the ability to participate in the decision 
making in any considerable degree during this period, as they generally were excluded from 
representation in any of the governmental bodies in charge of the agrarian question. The 
creation of the CONCODER illustrates this. The council had representatives from the 
government, various ministries and governmental developmental and agricultural crediting 
agencies, the Central Bank, the IBR as well as representatives for the latifundistas, the ARP. 
Still, despite this broad representation of advisors and other interest groups, none of the five 
national campesino organisations were included.
211
 In contrast, the above mentioned ARP, 
was represented in most government councils, as well as keeping close ties with President 
Rodríguez who were known to attend most of the organisation‟s meetings.212 
 
The demands from the campesino organsiations resulted in few real changes to alter the 
agrarian situation in the country. Instead, the period was characterised by unfulfilled promises 
from the Rodrigués Government and the continuation of past traditions from the dictatorship 
in dealing with rural conflicts.
213
 Land occupations and rural conflicts in general were 
increasingly dealt with through the use of extensive force by the government as well as the 
latifundistas themselves, either assisted by the police or hired gunmen. In 1990 police and 
army units swept the countryside burning the provisional homes of land occupants and 
destroying their crops and belongings, followed by the arrest of hundreds of people. As an 
example, in 1990 and in the month of July alone, over 200 campesinos were imprisoned in 
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Ciudad de Este.
214
 In 1991 a total of 66 cases of conflict over land and 556 arrests for alleged 
crimes were reported, including the reports of the murders on five campesino leaders.
215
 
These actions were frequently justified as proclaimed acts of defence of private property. 
However, as Nagel points out, the protection of property rights in the country was far from 
universal. On several occasions campesinos were denied titles to land that were already paid 
for or driven away from their properties.
216
  
 
The absence of the campesino organsiations in the political decision making arena and the 
continuing of repression and violence against the campesinos and the landless indicate the 
presence of severe deficiencies in the democratic development in the country. To provide a 
clearer picture of some of the underlying components in the development of the agrarian 
question in this period, the next section will examine the public discourse that followed this 
issue. 
 
 
 
4.1.3.1 The Public Discourse 
 
The public discourse concerning the agrarian question in the first phase of democratisation 
soon evolved from a positive to a highly negative public image of the campesinos and 
landless families and their demands. According to Nagel this transformation can be explained 
on the basis of two factors. As accounted for in chapter two, most of Stroessner‟s political 
supporters, in this case the rural elite, continued to have a powerful position in the Paraguayan 
society despite the downfall of the regime. The elite‟s political and economical privileges 
derived from within the old clientilistic structure, however, emerging outside this structure, -
the campesino movement challenged both these privileges. Politically the movement 
demurred the political primacy of the rural elite by seeking participation in the decision 
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making processes. Economically, the campesino movement posed a threat through its rising 
demands for land, justified through the traditional usufruct right to occupation of uncultivated 
or underexploited land. In particular, this development was a serious threat to the group of the 
rural elite engaged in the new opportunities of rent-seeking
217
  activities generated through the 
expansion of the capitalist farming in the 1970s.
218
 
 
Lacking the extensive control mechanisms applied to suppress land conflict under the 
dictatorship, in an the effort to protect their position in society – the rural elite turned to what 
was regarded as the best measure available within the new political framework, the public 
discourse. With the use of ideological connotations the latifundistas sought to discredit the 
campesinos and the landless, portraying them as radicals with communist connections and as 
a destabilising and violent force in the Paraguayan society. It was the campesinos who 
threatened to undermine democracy and the rule of law.
219
 Specifically, the latifundistas  
attempted to deflect the understanding and the public opinion of land conflict and land 
rights.
220
  
 
In 1990 Rodríguez declared “total war on invaders of private property.”221 Public statements 
from other authorities also contributed to the shift of opinion, such as the IBR announcing that 
invasions of private property were attacks on human rights.222 According to Nagel, these 
efforts led the traditional usufruct right to land to disappear from the public discourse, 
indicating just how much power of influence the latifundistas still enjoyed in the Paraguayan 
society.
223
 Within this new, emerging public perception of the rural question, occupants of 
land were branded as criminals, contributing to legitimise the use of repression and violence 
by the latifundistas and their allies as a rightful defence of what was already theirs. Moreover, 
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the rural elite attempted to change the opinion of which policy measures needed to be taken in 
order to solve the rural issues in the country. The altifundistas argued that enhancing the 
agricultural productivity was the key to overcome the problems, and that this should not be 
confused with changing the ownership of land. Thus, the campesino demand for agrarian 
reform through the extensive redistribution of land was in this discourse portrayed as a hinder 
rather than a stimulus to further national development and economic prosperity.
224
 
 
The development in the agrarian question in the initial years after the downfall of Stroessner 
can be interpreted as an expression of the democratisation process in the country in 
perspective of the conflict between the campesino movement and the rural elite. The tension 
between these groupings may be understood as a power struggle between new and old 
political actors trying to find their position in the dimension between the still existing 
arrangements of the Stroessner regime and the emerging democratic structures that coexisted 
in this period. In other words it was a battle over who were to take part in democracy and on 
which terms. The nature of the development in the agrarian question suggests that old political 
players and old traditions continued to play a powerful role in the Paraguayan society 
throughout this period, expressing the strong persistence of pre-democratic traditions and 
structures. What influence decision making in such an environment are the political 
perceptions of what seem possible facing conflicting interests and demands among important 
support groups and potentially dangerous opponents. Usually, the state will have to choose 
between promoting the interests of the rural poor, or those of its more powerful support 
groups.
225
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4.2 A Legislative Turning Point; the 1992 Constitution 
 
As previously discussed in chapter two, the new Constitution in 1992 constituted a turning 
point in the democratisation process in Paraguay. The event was also crucial in providing a 
first change in the agrarian legal basis that had survived from the Stroessner era. According to 
Nagel, the Constitutional debate concerning the articles of agrarian regulations in the new 
Constitution developed along the same lines as the public discourse in the years prior to the 
event. Ultimately, it was presented as a choice between land reform and rural development.
226
 
The national Constitutional assembly, consisting of only a few campesino representatives, in 
the end adopted articles, much of it drawn from a draft suggested by the ARP, providing a 
strong guarantee of private property rights.
227
 The Constitution continued to, as in the former 
1967 Constitution, to confirm expropriation of underexploited land as a measure of meeting 
social needs in the country. However, at the same time it was declared that expropriations 
were to be compensated fully in advance, each case to be determined through the passing of a 
specific law.
228
 Nagel argues such a demand made expropriation practically impossible, thus 
leaving agrarian reform in the form of redistribution of land difficult to carry out.  
 
A crucial change from earlier agrarian legislation was the exclusion of the traditional usufruct 
right to land in the new Constitution. This move relieved the state in a significant degree from 
its responsibility concerning the land issue and left it a matter of regulation through the 
market forces.
229
 In a wider historical context the regulations in the 1992 Constitution can be 
understood as part of a general trend in rural development strategy in the Latin American 
region in the 1980s and 1990s in the shift towards neoliberal policies, precisely characterised 
by their objective in stimulating rural development and prosperity through the market.
230
 In 
perspective of the democratisation process the agrarian articles in the new Constitution can be 
understood as an expression of the emergence of liberal democratic values. The fact that this 
development coincided with the interests of the rural elite created an increasingly difficult 
situation for the campesinos and the landless in Paraguay.  
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4.3 The Lack of Further Agrarian Legislation 
 
The inauguration in 1993 of Paraguay‟s first civilian president in 39 years, Juan Carlos 
Wasmosy, represented further advances to the democratisation processes. Despite the 
continuing persistence of many of the old elements from the Stroessner regime, the period 
witnessed increased participation of new political actors facilitated through the new 
Constitution, as well as the implementation of basic democratic reforms.
231
 In the agrarian 
question, economic recession and climate conditions, in particular in the second half of the 
1990s, contributed to further misery for the campesino population. Although data from the 
2008 agrarian census suggests a decrease in the concentration of land during this period
232
, 
poverty levels in the rural areas remained high.
233
  
 
Demands from the campesinos expressed through demonstrations, marches and land 
occupations continued to characterise the Paraguayan society. As political actors, the various 
organisations in general became stronger in this period, despite fractionalisation as a unified 
movement towards the end of the 1990s.
234
 Nonetheless, rural conflicts continued to be solved 
through the use of repression and violence from the government and the rural elite, and as in 
the period before the efforts from the Paraguayan government to change the agrarian situation 
in the country bore, literally, little fruit.
235
 Finally, rural conflicts and the ominous presence of 
the agrarian question constituted throughout the period a source of instability in an already 
fragile political climate that culminating in the attempted coup d‟état in 1996 and the murder 
of the vice president in 1999.
236
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The demoractic elected Wasmosy had generated hopes of change amongst the Paraguayan 
campesinos and landless. In the election campaign every candidate promised measures 
towards solving the agrarian issues in the countries, though consequently failing to offer 
specific solutions to the problems.
237
 However, rather than leading to a new direction in the 
development of the agrarian question, the new president, a member of Stroessner‟s Colorado 
Party and a former president of the ARP, represented a prolonging of old traditions in the 
relations between the campesinos, the rural elite and the government.
238
  
 
Unified through the creation of the National Coordinating Committee of Campesino 
Organisations (MCNOC), the campesinos gained strength in the early 1990s in their role as 
political actors, which materialised through the increase in demonstrations and land 
occupations.
239
 Amongst several other events, the magnitude of their dissatisfaction and 
increased strength could be seen in the massive demonstration on March 15
th
, 1994. More 
than 15 000 campesinos and landless from all over the nations came together in Asunción in a 
historic manifestation of solidarity, as can be seen in the images below. This event marked the 
beginning of what has developed into an annual national campesino demonstration.
240
 Despite 
the joint attempts of the campesino organsiations, repression and violence continued under the 
Wasmosy government. Moreover, the government‟s efforts to solve the rural problems in 
country were mainly limited to the expropriation of single tracts of land. To illustrate the 
ineffectiveness of these measures, according to official figures, 527 000 hectares of land was 
expropriated since the coup, though only 47 000 hectares was distributed to the target group 
of landless families.
241
 As the redistribution of land was not accompanied with any technical 
and social assistance or official credit, the families receiving land were often forced to 
abandon the land assigned to them as they did not possess the resources needed to take 
advantage of it.
242
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Image 4.2. Picture from the nationwide campesino demonstration in Asunción on the 15
th
 of March, 1994. 
The picture shows the crowd of people who had gathered in front of the National Parlament. 
 
 
 
Image 4.3. Picture from the nationwide campesino demonstration in Asunción on the 15
th
 of March, 1994. 
The picture shows a regional division of the campesino organisation FNC from the department of San 
Pedro. 
 
76 
 
In the 1998 elections Raúl Cubas succeeded Wasmosy as president. Cubas was, however, 
forced to resign in March 1999 because of his alleged participation in the murder of the vice 
president the same month.
243
 The campesino organisations played a significant role in Cubas‟ 
downfall through participating in a massive demonstration demanding that Cuba would step 
down.
244
 Luis Ángel Gonzáles Macchi took over the presidency, and promised the 
campesinos political stability as well as measures to battle the increasing levels of rural 
poverty.
245
 The genealogy in the late 1990s of falling international prices on cotton, problems 
of parasites, and climatic disruptions added to the already precarious situation of the small-
scale cotton farmers.
246
  
 
 
However, the earlier unified campesino movement was now split into two fractions fraction 
due to ideological differences. Campesino mobilisation and protests continued, but in a lesser 
scale than under the Wasmosy Government.
247
 As during the first phase of democratisation, 
demands for a new agrarian legislation were repeated. Various projects were delivered to 
Congress for evaluation with suggestions of a partial or total modification of the 1963 
Agrarian Legislation, such as the Program of Agricultural Modernisation (PROMODAR), the 
National Institute of Colonisation and Agrarian Reform (INCORA), the Agrarian Code and 
the National Secretary of Land and Rural Development (SENTDER). The evaluation and 
approving of the projects were continuously put on a standstill in Congress for long periods, 
before being rejected.
248
 Then, in 2002, a new Agrarian Statute was finally created, replacing 
the 1963 Statute implemented in the Stroessner era. As mentioned in the introduction the new 
statute was followed by another law replacing the IBR with the INDERT in 2004. 
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4.3.1 Explaining the Lack of a New Legislation; Between Changes in the Decision 
Making Arena and the Persistence of the Old Structures 
 
 
The absence of a new agrarian legislation in the second phase of democratisation coincided 
with the further introduction of new democratic elements. This has to be understood within 
the context of changes of the political decision making arena in the period, but simultaneously 
an expression of this development itself. However, as in the former stage of democratisation, 
elements from the Stroessner regime continued to be a part of the political structure.  
   
The 1992 Constitution had re-structured the political landscape in Paraguay, balancing the 
relationship among the Executive, the Congress, and the Judiciary in contrast to the earlier 
arrangement from the dictatorship. The new Constitution weakened the veto powers of the 
president, who now could be overrun by an absolute majority of both congressional chambers 
Moreover, the president could no longer dismiss Congress, but the Congress could impeach 
the president. Reducing the powers of the President opposite Congress resulted in the shift 
from decision making revolving around the Executive, as it had been under the Strossner 
regime, towards being embedded in the Congress. As the Executive Branch also in the second 
phase of democratisation remained under Colorado control, the Congress became increasingly 
pluralistic due to the introduction of representative representation, thus facilitating the 
incorporation of the new political actors in the decision making and multiplying the number 
of veto points.
249
 
 
Furthermore, during this period of time a series of political events
250
 led to increased 
factionalism and infighting in the Colorado party, resulting in the president losing power over 
the party and in a significant weakening of the traditional Colorado-military relations with 
root in the Stroessner regime. The atomisation of the Colorado Party further contributed to 
increased possibilities for participation by other actors in the decision making as it created 
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room for the formation of strategic coalitions with the opposition forces in Congress.
251
 Thus, 
this new situation also opened up for increased participation for the various campesino 
organsisations.
252
  
 
The historical and institutional development described above changed the decision making 
process in the country, and the development in the question of a new agrarian legislation 
provides a relevant example of this. First of all, the weakening of the presidential powers over 
Congress significantly limited the president‟s ability to impose the policy agenda in 
comparison to earlier periods. This was reinforced by the established presidential re-election 
ban by the 1992 Constitution, making every president a „lame duck‟ in the ability to enforce 
decision making at the end of term. Furthermore, because of the pluralistic and fractious 
divisions that emerged within both congressional chambers in this period all presidents 
encountered serious obstacles in assembling congressional support for their law making 
initiatives. The combination of the weak presidential prerogatives and the lack of 
congressional majority became throughout the period a recipe for political deadlock, as was 
the case under the Wasmosy Government where any effort at implementing wider agrarian 
reforms fell apart as the conflicts between the campesinos and the large landowners 
continuously put president Wasmosy in political check.
253
  
 
According to Molinas et al., within this political climate the practice of passing of 
particularistic
254
 laws developed due to the cost of enforcing comprehensive and regulatory 
reforms with redistributive intent. Effective and extensive reforms imply radical changes in 
economic and political relations, and are therefore very difficult for the various actors to agree 
upon. Rather, particularistic laws with low visibility and low marginal cost which are less 
likely to generate conflict within the legislative or Executive-legislative relations therefore 
become the trend.
255
 Thus, the absence of a new agrarian legislation can be understood as a 
result of this development, explaining the thirteen years with various projects under 
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evaluation in Congress, but with no result. Moreover, instead of reform, the agrarian 
legislation passed in this period all had the characteristics of being particularistic laws, such as 
the numerous „expropriation laws‟256 passed.257 
 
Coexisting and interacting with the new emerging decision making system was the continuing 
persistence of certain significant pre-democratic elements, in particular the clientilistic 
tradition characterising the political culture of the Stroessner regime. In this phase of 
democratisation, initiated by the 1992 Constitution, decision making was thus conducted 
within new democratic structures, though the outcome being ultimately decided upon with 
little regard to the accompanying democratic rules. Contributing to a system of multiple 
political actors, factionalism and infighting shaped by democratisation and political instability 
was the old political conduct of personal agreements and corruption. This created a political 
climate that undermined trust and cooperation, making the building of strong and long lasting 
coalitions necessary to implement any extensive changes virtually impossible.
258
 According to 
Philip, those partisan aspects that are a necessary part of the democratic process become to 
dominate the entire state.
259
 As a part of this political climate, it is not surprising the thirteen 
years of absence of any extensive agrarian legislation, taking into consideration the deep rift 
in the matter between the rural elite and the campesino organsiations on the issue. 
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4.4 A New Agrarian Legislation: an Expression of Democracy? 
 
In January 2002, followed by the creation of a new agrarian institute, INDERT, in 2004, a 
new agrarian statute
260
 was implemented after seven years of negotiation in Congress. The 
final documents were the result of a compromise between the various campesino 
organisations, agrarian producer organisations, the agro-industry unions, and the ARP.
261
 
Accompanying the new agrarian statute was the creation of INDERT in 2004, replacing the 
IBR established under the dictatorship. In contrast with the IBR, the INDERT was created 
with closer ties to the Executive, via the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock.
262
 The 
institute had the objective of carrying out agrarian policy in accordance with the regulations 
set in the Constitution and in the agrarian statute.
263
 This section analyses the new agrarian 
legislation, examining its characteristic and how it reflected the democratic development in 
the country. 
 
Responding to earlier demands from the campesino organisations, the 2002 Agrarian Statute 
was in its nature more democratic than the former legislation, in particular regarding the 
declared beneficiaries of the new law. First of all, the article from the 1963 Agrarian 
Legislation defining members of the Armed Forces as privileged beneficiaries in receiving 
land was removed. Second, the age limit established in the 1963 legislation on the receiving 
on certain types of farms were also removed, the new legislation specifically stating that the 
beneficiaries of the law were Paraguayan citizens engaged in agrarian activity, regardless of 
sex and age.
264
 As in the 1992 Constitution, the 2002 Agrarian Statute established specific 
assistance to be given in providing easier access to property for women in rural areas.
265
 
Moreover, in contrast to the former statute, the 2002 statute no longer endorsed foreigners as 
beneficiaries of receiving agricultural land on equal terms as Paraguayan citizens.
266
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Rural development was established as the primary objective of the new agrarian legislation, 
with the goal of erasing rural poverty and its consequences. The law acknowledged, as in the 
1992 Constitution, agrarian reform as the fundamental measure in achieving this.
267
 
Diminishing the high concentration of land in the country and providing sufficient land to its 
beneficiaries, the statute reaffirmed expropriation and colonisation as a measure of 
redistributing land. Though, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, the regulations in the new 
Constitution limited severely the use of this instrument in practice.
268
 Colonisation had, as 
discussed earlier, been abandoned as a measure of distributing land at the beginning of the 
1990s.  
 
The definition of agrarian reform in the 2002 Agrarian Statute may, as in the Constitution, be 
interpreted as having a technical rather than a structural and redistributive character. Rural 
development was to be achieved primarily through increased productivity, stimulating the 
development of the agro-industry which would again improve the conditions in the rural 
areas, and through the rationalisation of the market.
269
 In such, the new agrarian statute can be 
interpreted as continuing the development established in the agrarian articles in the 1992 
Constitution in the introduction of market related policies as a solution to the rural problems 
in the country and as an expression of the general reduction of state presence and control in 
the Paraguayan society through the process of democratisation. Thus, the new agrarian statute 
stood in sharp contrast to the former statute implemented under Stroessner which was 
characterised by high levels of state control. 
 
During the presidency of Oscar Nikanor Duarte Frutos in the period between 2003 and 2008, 
data from the recent 2008 agrarian census indicate that the situation for the campesinos in the 
country somewhat improved. First of all, the new agrarian census suggests a smaller 
concentration of agricultural land compared to the census of 1991.
270
 This change was 
however diminutive, and can to some extent be explained by the decrease in the rural 
population in the same period of time as well as less people becoming involved in agricultural  
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activities.
271
 In general, the levels of rural poverty seem to have decreased between 2002 and 
2007.
272
 Though recognising the advances made through the implementation of a new 
legislation, old demands continued to be heard from the campesino organisations, in particular 
the demand for a „real‟ redistributive agrarian reform. Land occupations and demonstrations 
continued against what the campesino organisations termed a systematic structural violence 
by the Paraguayan state since the beginning of the Stroessner regime.
273
  The new legislation 
was also critisised for being too conservative in its nature, giving way to a further introduction 
of neoliberal reforms since the adoption of the agrarian articles in the 1992 Constitution. 
Moreover, the campesino organisations came with a strong critique of the Duarte government 
for not following up the new regulations with more specific measures. 
 
 
Rural conflict continued to be solved through the use of repression and violence.
274
 Thus, in 
2008 the agrarian question, in particular the question of agrarian reform, still constituted a 
vital part of the national political agenda. Illustrating the seriousness of the matter was the 
article in the ABC Color on June 26
th
 2008, published five days after I arrived in Asuncion in 
order to conduct research for this thesis. The article told about a group of landless people, 
seen in the picture below, in the region of San Pedro that had set up to protect a piece of land 
they occupied being part of a real estate in the area, as a response to an incident where the 
guards of the estate had shot at them and set fire on their belongings. The personnel of the 
estate denied the incident. 
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Image 4.4 ”On the warpath in San Pedro”. 
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5 CHAPTER 5:  PARAGUAYAN REGIME BUILDING AND 
CONSOLIDATION IN THE LONG TERM HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT; THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the words of Douglass C. North, institutions “...evolve incrementally, connecting the past 
with the present and the future.”275 This chapter aims at making the underlying structures and 
mechanisms in the Paraguayan regime building and consolidation analysed in the two 
previous chapters more visible by discussing the development in a meta-perspective. In 
particular, the chapter aims at making clearer the dynamics and complexity within these 
structures and mechanisms. Furthermore, the chapter seeks to identify how the agrarian 
legislation worked as an expression and as well as serving a function within these processes, 
as suggested by the two secondary research questions of the thesis. In doing so, the chapter 
will address and further explore the three institutional perspectives given in the introduction 
of this thesis. These are; i) the interaction between the various rules of conduct comprising the 
institutional frameworks of respectively the Stroessner regime and the emerging democracy, 
and in particular in relation to the agrarian legislation as a component of the larger 
institutional whole, ii) the relation between the institutions and existing interest groups in the 
two regime-epochs, and iii) the historical development and change within the institutional 
frameworks. North‟s theories on institutions and institutional change will compose the frame 
of reference for the analysis in this chapter. 
 
 
Furthermore, in a broader regional and historical context, regime building and consolidation 
in Paraguay can be understood as part of the political development in the Latin American 
region since independence from the European colonial powers in the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 
centuries. Despite the region‟s variations in national historical contexts, academics have 
identified some common features in the underlying institutional frameworks. These features, 
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such as patronism, clientilism, organised use of repression and co-option trough the Armed 
Forces, the use and manipulation of nominally democratic institutions, have been understood 
as key components in explaining three major historical traits in the political development in 
Latin America. The first generalisation is emphasising how the authoritarian tradition has 
dominated Latin American region since independence. The second finding highlights how the 
transition from these authoritarian regimes towards becoming democracies can be interpreted 
as components in what political scientist Samuel Huntington has referred to as the third 
wave
276
 of democratisation. The third characteristic that has been accentuated is the political 
instability characterising the new and emerging democracies that followed this wave.
277
  
 
 
The chapter is divided chronologically in two sections, examining the Stroessner period and 
thereafter the democratisation process. Within these sections the chapter also provides a 
discussion of the agrarian legislation in the respective periods. The regional context is referred 
to throughout the chapter.  
 
 
 
 
5.2 The Stroessner Regime; institutionalised authoritarianism278 
 
As acknowledged in the second chapter, Stroessner built and consolidated his regime 
fundamentally by institutionalising his power within a system of clientilistic and nominally 
democratic structures. Scholars alike have ascribed the success of his regime on how he 
operated and managed the various components within the dynamics of this framework.
279
 
Furthermore, research suggests that institutionalised authoritarian regimes survive longer than 
regimes where the power only is vested in a personal leader.
280
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The Stroessner regime‟s pillars of power correspond with what according to North‟s 
terminology are denominated as informal and formal institutions.
281
 North defines institutions 
as humanly developed constraints shaping interpersonal relations. In line with this, individual 
actors or groups are perceived as primary agents of institutional change and development. 
Institutional changes are the results of these individuals or groups believing that they could 
benefit from altering the existing institutional constraints by some margin in the pursuit of 
their various objectives.
282
 Under the Stroessner regime, Stroessner himself served as the 
catalyst of unity to the base of political power through the alliance with the Colorado Party 
and the Armed Forces, Hence, Stroessner was holding strong bargaining powers and 
undertook the role as a primary agent in the shaping and altering of institutions. 
 
 
Stroessner cemented the fundaments of his regime on already existing political stuctures in 
Paraguay.
 
Succinctly summarised, such relations are characterised by the formations of 
different kinds of interpersonal exchange centering upon class, status, or family. These ties 
foster both vertical and horisontal networks of dependency, and across different 
socioeconomic levels as well as across the same social stratum. Politics within this system is 
understood as the search for potential personal economic or political gains.
283
 As discussed 
above, such structures can be defined as informal institutions. In the theoretical perspective 
offered by North, these may be understood as unwritten cooperative behaviour in an effort of 
diminishing the cost of human interaction by providing increased information of the 
consequences of the possible outcome. In a historical perspective such agreements have been 
understood as the first step towards more complex human political, economic, or social 
interaction. Informal institutions are components of culture, and are transmitted through 
generations via teaching and imitation of knowledge, values, or other factors influencing 
behavior. What is essential is that informal institutions are important sources of continuity in 
historical change.
284
  
 
 
The trajectory of institutional change is shaped by lock-in that comes from the relationship 
between institutions and organisations and by a feedback process by which people perceive 
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and react to changes. What produces lock-in is the dependence of the organisations in the 
institutional framework they once have emerged in response to.
285
 Where institutions are 
locked-in, one may apply what is referred to as path dependency theory in order to explain 
why changes do not occur. The path dependency theory views institutions as self reinforcing. 
When the initial conditions causes a lock-in, a path gets established which becomes difficult 
or impossible to deviate from.
286
 
 
 
In the Latin American region in general the clientilistic political structure was a heritage from 
the colonial time, originating from the relationship between el patron and his workers on the 
haciendas as well as from the Catholic Church.
287
 The development of a political culture in 
Latin America centered upon these types of interpersonal ties has been understood by scholars 
as a key component in explaining the absence of strong and formal institutions able to 
mitigate chaos and instability. Rather, the Latin American people have consequently gathered 
around strongmen for protection and development on local and regional political levels. 
Scholars argue that this tradition contributed to paving the way for authoritarianism in Latin 
America.
288
 
 
 
Stroessner emerged as such a strongman in the 1950s, after half a century characterised by 
political chaos and unstable governments in Paraguay.
289
 Coming to power within an informal 
institutional framework it might be perceived as congenital that Stroessner chose to build and 
consolidate his regime along these structures. Miranda argues that this political culture served 
well to strengthen the political power of Stroessner.
290
 In perspective of North‟s 
institutionalism, there was no need for Stroessner to alter this informal institution in the search 
of reaching his major objectives. On the contrary, control through political stability and 
legitimacy could be achieved within the existing institutional structure.
291
 Stroessner reaped 
the benefits of the institutional set up by effectively reinforcing and expanding the clientilistic 
                                                     
285
 North 1990: 8-9. 
286
 North 1990: 93-94, 112. 
287
 Kaufman 1974: 285-286; Miranda 1990: 13-16; Fowler 1996: xiii, 104-105, 119-121. 
288
 Collin 1979: 33; Miranda 1990: 2; Fowler 1996; xii-xiii. 
289
 Fowler 1996: 94-95. 
290
 Miranda 1990: 17-18 
291
 North 1990: 7-8, 73. 
88 
 
structures in Paraguay to all sides and levels of society. In result, nearly every group of the 
society was made dependent on the regime‟s existence.292 
 
 
Furthermore, as highlighted above, Stroessner also based his regime on nominally democratic 
institutions such as popular elections every fifth year, a multi-party system, and the rule of 
law. Due to the nature of authoritarian regimes, the existence of formal institutions is not a 
prerequisite for their establishment or survival, though such institutions often have led to 
more stable and longer lasting regimes.
293
 The existence and functioning of formal 
„democratic‟ institutions in authoritarian regimes have among scholars traditionally been 
depreciated as spurious. With autocratic rules, such institutions only have an auxiliary 
purpose in an effort of gaining international legitimacy and support.  
 
 
In her article Political Institutions under Dictatorship, the political scientist Jennifer Gandhi 
challenges this view. According to Gandhi, there are more complex reasons for why some 
authoritarian rulers choose to apply nominally democratic institutions into their rule whilst 
others do not. In her explanation, Gandhi accentuates the immense variation in authoritarian 
institutions. She emphasises the fact that in democracies the ruler that holds power knows that 
he/she is chosen by the people he/she is set to govern. In an authoritarian regime, however, 
the ruler does not have this kind of information and the regime‟s existence is based on 
building alliances and exerting various mechanisms of control. Therefore, Gandhi argues, 
authoritarian leaders apply those institutions that can help them prevent attempts that may 
undermine their legitimacy and usurp power, including formal and nominally democratic 
institutions.
294
 The institutionalisation of power within in the Stroessner regime can be 
understood as such an effort. 
 
 
Applying North‟s theories, the existence of institutions in an authoritarian regime will reduce 
the cost of interaction with political supporters, the opposition, and other members of society, 
compared to the absence of such institutions. In fact, according to North one can argue that 
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the implementing of institutions, formal or informal, is particularly important in authoritarian 
regimes, as the holding of power in these regime types represents situations of human 
interaction where information is incomplete and where the outcome is highly uncertain. From 
facing such complex situations emerges the need to develop regularised patters of interaction. 
The implementations of rules and procedures through institutions simplify this process. As 
institutional frameworks structures human interaction, they therefore limit the set of choices 
available to the actors.
295
  
 
 
North argues that the coexistence of formal and informal institutions increase the 
effectiveness of human interaction as they complement each other in lowering the information 
threshold and thus in reducing the cost of human exchange.
296
 As emphasised earlier in the 
thesis, scholars have argued that the success of Stroessner specifically can be explained on a 
basic level on how he actively attended and managed to mitigate between the different 
components within the regime‟s institutional framework, balancing between the use of formal 
and informal constraints of behavior. The best example of this is the use of the Colorado 
Party, vested in a „democratic‟ party structure, to control and organise society. Built up by a 
clientilistic structure it tied all levels of society to the regime due to its omnipresent 
character.
297
 Through the use of the Colorado Party Stroessner created a system of control 
with few limitations. According to North, institutional stability is partly explained precisely 
by the hierarchical organisation within this framework where each level in the hierarchy is 
more costly to change than the other
298
 The stability of such an institutional framework can 
thus be understood as a key explanation to the longevity of the Stroessner regime. 
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5.2.1 The Agrarian Legislation 
 
 
As illustrated in chapter three the agrarian legislation implemented under Stroessner can be 
understood as an expression of the institutionalisation of power within the dictatorship. First 
of all, Stroessner gained control over vital national resources, legitimised through the rule of 
law. Second, he gained control over the rural interest groups, the rural elite as well as the 
large group of campesinos and rural landless. Third, the legislation provided as a legal basis 
for the distribution of agrarian benefits to the regime‟s supporters. It also contributed to 
making the process of distribution more effective and organised. Thus, by institutionalising 
through law the organising and control over agrarian resources and rural interest groups, as 
understood from North‟s theory, Stroessner lowered the cost of interacting with the rural 
groups in the country. The extensive character of the agrarian regulation can be seen as a 
result of the above mentioned bargaining powers held by Stroessner in the decision making in 
this period.  
 
 
Moreover, as discussed in chapter three, the analysis shows that the enforcing of the agrarian 
legislation was executed along clientistic structures. First, the distribution of land indicated 
that land was being distributed to non-beneficiaries of the Agrarian Statute through various 
irregular means. Second, the creation of new agrarian colonies on the eastern boarder were 
organised in such a manner as to put the pioneers in a dependency relation to the government. 
Thus, the agrarian legislation and the enforcing of this can be perceived as an expression of 
the interaction between formal and informal institution in the Stroessner regime, in which 
North argues might have a reinforcing effect on their function. 
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5.3 The Democratisation Process: Institutional Change? 
 
 
The overthrow of Stroessner in 1989 and the subsequent introduction of democratisation 
caused comprehensive changes in the Paraguayan society. In a regional historical context this 
political upheaval can be perceived as a continuation of the series of transformations of 
authoritarian regimes towards emerging democracies in countries such as Ecuador, Peru, 
Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Honduras, and Guatemala.
299
  
 
 
From an institutional perspective, these regime-transitions can be understood to be what North 
defines as disruptive changes in the countries‟ formal institutional framework.300 According to 
North, what accounts for such disruptive changes, as briefly touched upon earlier in this 
chapter, can be found in the relationship between institutions and individuals or groups of 
actors. Formal institutions change according to what these actors perceive to improve their 
chances of reaching their particular objectives. Those with the strongest bargaining power 
among these actors decide how the new rules of the game are to be devised.
301
 
 
 
This can be explained better by comparing the situation in the two regimes. The Stroessner 
regime persisted for such a long period of time because of Stroessner‟s bargaining strength in 
relation to his political allies, and because for a long time these allies held a united front in the 
pursuit of their common goals. Moreover, it was a result of the ability to suppress or co-opt 
those actors within the regime who did not share these goals. In the last decade of the regime, 
however, Stroessner‟s power to mitigate between his political allies diminished because of the 
emerging fractions within the regime.
302
 In contrast, the number of actors competing to 
enhance their objectives had multiplied under democratisation. Those with the strongest 
bargaining power in this new reality thus had the opportunity to change the rules if they 
wanted to do so. According to political scientist Adam Przeworski et al. previously 
authoritarian supporters comply with democratic changes because they believe that they can 
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continue to advance their interests through such institutions. A key factor is that a democratic 
institutional framework, in contrast to the often highly complex and volatile structures of 
authoritarian regimes, provides these actors with increased information about the future.
303
 
 
 
The new or emerging Latin American democracies in the 1980s and 1990s were characterised 
by high levels of political instability and crisis, as was Paraguay. Scholars have emphasised 
that in order to provide stability to a democracy it needs to be consolidated. In short, as 
defined in the introduction chapter, this means that the democratic rules do not only exist but 
are also accepted and valued.
304
 Political scientist George Philip argues that while the 
democracies in Latin America held free and fair elections, a more fundamental 
institutionalisation of the rules presumed necessary for democratic consolidation did not take 
place. Though a highly complex matter, Philip has argued the survival of pre-democratic 
patterns of political behaviour as a key factor in this development.
305
 Characteristically, the 
bureaucracies remained organised along clientilistic structures, law enforcement were weak, 
and public opinion often supported law-breaking by their political leaders.
306
 Thus, not 
following the democratic rules became an accepted political strategy.
307
  
 
 
As emphasised in chapter four, despite the introduction of new democratic rules, the political 
actors did not follow these to a full extent. Democratisation was marked by the persistence of 
old authoritarian traits of political behavior inherited from the Stroessner regime. This was 
particularly well demonstrated in the new decision making structure that emerged. While new 
rules for the law making process were enforced through the 1992 Constitution, the political 
bargaining within Congress was done through interpersonal agreements and corruption. Mario 
et al. in their country analysis for the World Bank argue that these pre-democratic behaviour 
patterns were widespread in the emerging Paraguayan democracy throughout the 1990s and 
continuing into the new millennium. Furthermore, they emphasise that Paraguay was 
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exceptional even to Latin American standards, in its extreme informality in state decisions 
and lack of democratic institutionalisation.
308
 
 
 
Przeworski argues that in a transaction period from an authoritarian regime towards 
democratisation, basic institutional issues are unlikely to be resolved. This is because the pro 
democratic forces seeking to establish the new regime are prone to adopt an institutional 
framework that is perceived as only a temporarily expedient. Thus, this context leaves room 
for the continuing persistence of pre-democratic institutional traits.
309
 As discussed in chapter 
four this was the case in the regime change in Paraguay in 1989 where the transition towards 
democracy emerged from within the old political structures of the Stroessner regime. It was 
not until the establishing of the new national Constitution in 1992 that any significant changes 
were made to alter the formal institutions in a democratic direction. 
 
 
As explained by North an institutional framework is a highly complex structure consisting of 
a set of rules of conduct organised in a hierarchical manner. If abrupt changes occur in the 
formal rules, even at the top of the institutional hierarchy, the informal constraints, slow in 
change, will typically continue to provide stability to the overall framework. According to 
North, this is what makes the development of more complex forms of political, economic, and 
social human interaction over time and space possible.
310
 Moreover, as changes always are 
affected by their antecedents and not only the result of a bargaining between different actors, 
this sometimes leads to path dependence.
311
 From an organisational perspective, pre-
democratic constraints continued to conduct a vital part of politics in the Latin American 
region because the political actors with the most bargaining strength perceive them as still 
viable in the pursuit of their objectives. Moreover, the fact that clientilistic structures, an 
inheritance from the colonial era, are a dominant factor in Latin American democracies 
almost two centuries later show that history does matter. 
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5.3.1 The Question of the Agrarian Legislation 
 
As examined in chapter four, the question of agrarian legislation under democratisation in 
Paraguay can be understood as an expression of the complexity and dynamics between the 
various components within the emerging regime‟s institutional framework. Moreover, the 
institutional perspective may at the same time make more visible the reasons to why the 
agrarian legislation in this period was not in sync with the rest of the legal institutional 
framework, more specifically the agrarian articles in the 1992 Constitution, as well as the 
wider formal institutional framework.  
 
 
The struggle between the rural elite and the campesinos and rural landless in the period of 
democratisation can be understood as a continuous battle between these groups of actors, 
seeking to alter the institutions of agrarian legislation in accordance with the groups 
preferences. During the course of this contention, an increase in the bargaining power held by 
the campesino organisations relatively to the rural elite became increasingly visible.  
 
 
Moreover, the law making process of the new agrarian legislation is an expression of the 
mutual relation found between institutions and organisations as well as the interaction 
between different institutions. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, North perceive 
organisations to develop from and evolve according to the opportunities offered by 
institutions. Organisations are in return major agents of institutional change in the pursuit of 
reaching their objectives. As the new Constitution changed the rules of the game, the 
campesino organsiations gained bargaining strength in the decision making arena as oppose to 
having practically none during the previous regime. However, at same time the Constitution 
opened up for the existence of multiple political actors, thus reducing and dividing the 
bargaining power amongst each group of actors. Moreover, what made institutional change 
difficult was the interaction between the new formal democratic rules of the decision making 
process and the persisting informal constraints inherited from the Stroessner regime, as this 
fostered an inhospitable environment for the building of strong and sustainable alliances 
among various actors. Thus, also within the question of the agrarian legislation the interaction 
between old pre-democratic and new democratic institutions was visible. However, the 
example of the agrarian legislation demonstrates an important difference. The agrarian 
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legislation can be defined as a formal institution, and should – in theory – thus have been 
changed with the rest of the formal institutions in the process of democratisation. As 
mentioned in the fourth chapter, a new agrarian statute was not implemented for over thirteen 
years after the downfall of the Stroessner regime. Explained by the theory of North, this can 
be understood as a result of the bargaining between the various actors –those with the 
bargaining power being resistant to change, or no one having sufficient power to in relation to 
one another to be able to generate change. In the case of the agrarian legislation this might 
thus have led to path dependency. 
 
 
In sum, this chapter has discussed the analysis of the regime building and consolidation in 
Paraguay from the two previous chapters on a meta-level. The chapter has in such made more 
comprehensible the underlying structures within this development –in the attempt of the 
construction of a historical synthesis in this thesis. Moreover, as the chapter has demonstrated 
the distinctiveness of the development in Paraguay, it has also argued that the regime building 
and consolidation in the country between 1954 and 2008 can be understood as part of the 
development in the broader context of a Latin American political history. 
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6 CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 
FOR THE ROAD AHEAD 
 
 
 
This master thesis has examined the regime building and consolidation processes in Paraguay 
between 1954 and 2008. This was a period characterised by two regime epochs –the 
Stroessner regime between 1954 and 1989 and the subsequent period of democratisation up 
till present day. The analysis has embraced both historical continuity and change in Paraguay 
by examining two ostensibly distinctly different political regimes; dictatorship and 
democracy. 
 
 
 
Analysing the regime building and consolidation in the given period, the thesis applied an 
institutional approach. Three perspectives were emphasised in this regard. The first 
perspective focused on explaining the development and changes of the institutional elements 
within the larger whole of the regimes. The second concerned the relations between the 
regimes and the political and social actors in the Paraguayan society. Finally, the third 
perspective sought to make the historical development and changes within the regime‟s 
institutional frameworks visible. The aim of this perspective was to comprehend the 
underlying mechanisms and structures in the development of the regime building and 
consolidation, focusing in particular on the importance of demonstrating the dynamics and 
complexity within the institutional frameworks. Within this approach the theory of institutions 
and institutional change offered by Douglass C. North will be applied as an analytical tool. On the 
background of this approach, the thesis has been understood as aiming at the construction of a 
historical synthesis. 
 
 
 Within the institutional approach, regime building and consolidation in the period was 
analysed in light of agrarian legislation. This was done because of the fact that Paraguay has 
remained a predominantly rural society. Agriculture constituted the main component in the 
national economy as well as the basic source of survival to the majority of the population. 
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Throughout the period agriculture defined the pattern of settlement and social structure due to 
the perseverance of limited economic diversification and a low rate of urbanisation. 
Specifically, the thesis sought out to examine how the agrarian legislation could be 
understood as an expression of the political regimes in their search for legitimacy and political 
stability through having a vital function within these processes. This was operationalised 
through two secondary research questions and analysed in chapters three and four. 
 
 
 
The third chapter examined the regime building and consolidation of the Stroessner regime 
between 1954 and 1989. The chapter analysed the agrarian legislation implemented under 
Stroessner as a political instrument in the search of legitimacy and political stability and as a 
functional mechanism of control. The analysis was conducted by following the development 
of the agrarian legislation implemented under Stroessner. First, the chapter identified rural 
obstacles in the beginning of the Stroessner regime posing a threat to the further existence of 
the regime. The rural problems manifested themselves on a national level trough stagnation in 
the agricultural sector and as potential national uprising in the Paraguayan countryside. 
Second, the chapter discussed the law making process, emphasising the lack of participation 
by central rural interest groups in the decision making through the use of repression and co-
opting of these actors. Third, the chapter analysed the agrarian legislation implemented in 
1963 as a political instrument generating legitimacy and political support by balancing 
between elite interests and mass acceptance. Gaining support from the elite, the legislation 
organised and streamlined the distribution of agrarian resources to these political groups –
especially the rural landowning elite and the Armed Forces. The regime sought mass 
acceptance in the large rural campesino population by promises of rural welfare and 
prosperity in the legislation. The examination of the legal documents suggested a wide use of 
rhetoric to have been used in this respect. The analysis of newspaper articles from the 
Stroessner period supported this notion. The chapter argued that elite preferences were 
preferred attained in practice through the execution of the laws. The chapter illustrated that 
the agrarian legislation both in design and in practice could be understood as an expression of 
the institutional framework within the Stroessner regime, characterised by the wide use of 
institutionalised control mechanisms and informal clientilistic structures. Finally, the chapter 
identified the agrarian legislation and the growing dissent with the regulations in this as a 
component in the downfall of the Stroessner regime.  
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The fourth chapter examined the democratisation process and consolidation of democracy 
between 1989 and 2008. The chapter asked how the question of the implementation of a new 
and more democratic agrarian legislation, replacing the one implemented in the previous 
regime, could be understood as an expression of the mechanisms at work in the 
democratisation. This was a demand set forth by the emerging campesino organisations in the 
period as a result of the introduction of political rights and the opening of civil society. 
However, it would take thirteen years before a complete agrarian legislation was 
implemented. The chapter examined the development in the legislation by first analysing the 
demands set forth by the campesino organisations in the initial phase of democratisation. In 
this period the rural elite, still with strong connections to the new Paraguayan government, 
managed to hinder the implementation of a new agrarian statute. In 1992, however, a new 
Constitution was implemented. The Constitution altered the institutional framework of the 
emerging regime, and opened up for participation in the decision making arena by the 
campesino organisations. However, old clientislitic traditions continued to characterised the 
law making in the country, despite the introduction of new democratic rules. The chapter 
argued this to be the main reason to the lack of a new agrarian legislation, as the emerging 
structure of the decision making process hindered the building of alliances in the Congress. 
Finally, in 2002 and 2004 a new agrarian legislation was completed. The chapter analysed the 
new legal documents as an expression of emerging democratic ideals. The chapter illustrated 
how the development in the implementation of a new agrarian legislation could be understood 
as an expression of the mechanisms at work in the new political structure, in particular in the 
interaction between old pre-democratic clientilistic traditions and new democratic institutions. 
 
 
In the fifth chapter the analysis in the chapter three and four was discussed in a meta-
perspective. The chapter focused on the three political perspectives given for the thesis and 
examined the mechanisms and structures in the regime‟s institutional framework according to 
the theory of North. The chapter also placed the regime building and consolidation in a 
broader Latin American historical perspective.   
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6.1.1 The Road Ahead 
 
Expectations for change were high in August 2008 as the newly elected president, the 
candidate of the centre-left coalition Fernando Lugo, stepped into office, ending the Colorado 
Party‟s 61 year grip on power in the country. Similar as his predecessors, agrarian reform had 
been a primary focus in Lugo‟s election campaign, and known as a long time defender for 
rural welfare and peasants rights in his work through the catholic church hopes for change 
seemed to be higher than ever before.
312
 A priority of the Lugo Government, through a 
process of negotiation with the various campesino organisations and other rural interest 
groups, Lugo set the stage for further advancing a democratic participation in the country. A 
proposal for a new agrarian legislation is currently under approval in Congress.
313
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http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/21/world/americas/21paraguay.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=Lugo+Paraguay&st
=cse. Read 15.05.09. 
313
 http://www.abc.com.py/2009-03-24/articulos/506703/dicen-que-reforma-agraria-es-prioridad-del-gobierno.  
Read 15.05.09; http://www.abc.com.py/2008-05-26/articulos/418440/lugo-busca-reforma-agraria-sin-violencia. 
Read 15.05.09. 
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